STRENGTHENING FOR REVOLUTIONARY TASKS
THROUGH STRENGTHENING TO REVOLUTION AND SOCIALISM…
A. Introduction
This document, to be presented for the review and approval of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Turkey, began to be written on May 15, 2024, following a series of meetings. It went through a comprehensive discussion and evaluation process until the 14th Congress Turkey Meeting held on September 7-8. It was first evaluated by the relevant central committees of the party. The report, which was revised in line with the proposals received, was sent to the party organisations in June. Then, in line with the suggestions filtered from the many written contributions from TKP members and volunteers and the minutes of the political report meetings in which all TKP organisations participated, amendments were made and the report was presented to the delegates. The report you are reading was finalised with the contributions of the delegates at the 14th Congress Turkey Meeting.
As of the date of publication of this report , the repercussions of the March 31 local election results continue to resonate across all political platforms. New chapters are constantly being opened in the struggle between different factions of the state and the AKP. The economic policies shaped by the AKP government in line with the demands of big capital are being reinforced with elements that make the lives of the working people unimaginably difficult.
Israel’s massacre in Gaza continues unabated, the war in Ukraine is constantly producing new scenarios not only on the battlefield but also in the governance of both countries, and hot developments prone to new crisis are occurring in our neighboring countries throughout Syria,Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia.
After some time this text is approved by the Congress and declared dor the public information, it will not be surprising if events necessitating re-evaluation in some of these areas are triggered. It is also possible for some issues, not listed here, to rapidly rise to the top of the agenda.
Even setting aside a revolutionary party that takes itself seriously, cares about itself, and acts with the ambition of changing the country and the world, no think tank or research center would attempt to prepare a comprehensive report encompassing all areas from A to Z and diluting critical topics within this entirety in such an environment.
We take ourselves seriously, we care about ourselves, and we act with the ambition of changing the country and the world.
After evaluating the recent past with the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and with a certain integrity, it is a commonly accepted approach in congress processes, and one that our party has preferred in the past, to make some fundamental predictions for the future and to derive tasks. The reason we have preferred to focus on one or a few topics in our congresses and conferences for some time now has been concerns that the aforementioned approach has started to become unproductive, among other things. Structured written texts that do not exclude any significant subheading of social and political life had to increasingly sacrifice content to withstand current developments and gain a certain durability.
One aspect of the issue is that we are facing an increase in data flow that is incomparable to the 20th century. Marxism offers us a very powerful method to differentiate primary issues from secondary ones and to derive insightful results from the existing objectivity, no matter how complex the concrete reality is. Nevertheless, the impact of information on reality can reach destructive levels in some cases, and some topics that might be seen as insignificant or unnecessary details in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class can have a significant impact on political and ideological dynamics.
However, the main issue is the increasing uncertainty following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the world drifting into a chaotic climate instead of achieving a new balance. The most distinctive feature of this climate is the increase in the number of actors that need to be taken into account on both international and national scales. Each new actor to be considered means an increase in the number of vectors that interact, collide against, or conflict with each other.
The working class, as the gravedigger of capitalism, is also a force that practically limits and even regulates it. Although the proletariat does not have a mission to discipline the bourgeoisie, the struggle between labor and capital reins in the exploiting class in certain instances. After the collapse of the USSR, as the pressure exerted by the working class decreased on a world scale, not only did capitalism start to operate more unrestrainedly, but the contradictions within the system also became more uncontrolled in both national and international levels. When we mention the increase in the number of actors to be considered, this should be taken into account with the fact that the working class’ struggle against bourgeois dictatorship has a simplifying effect. The temporary loss of momentum in this struggle weakened the tendency of the elements within the imperialist-capitalist system to unite against their common enemy -the working class- to some extent.
In these conditions, it is more important than ever to focus on the points of reality that can empower our will to change the world in order to fulfill our task of understanding and interpreting the world. For a revolutionary entity, the primary criterion must be the weak points of the established order we are obliged to destroy, which are susceptible to the interventions of the working class. Today, the working class’ lack of necessary energy for such interventions is not at all a reason to refrain from this criterion. Expectations that the working class can accumulate energy on a plane outside these points are in clear contradiction with what the history of class struggle has taught us.
There are significant differences between a reformist perspective and a revolutionary perspective in addressing phenomena that define today’s capitalist world, such as wars, political and ideological instability, hegemony crisis, migration, racism, and the rapid impoverishment of working masses. These differences can be seen not only in the “definition of tasks” but also in the description phase of the issues.
We must not operate from any random “whole” that is not part of any complete entity but one that has been passed through the prism of a specific strategy and, in this sense, can be broken down into critical parts. In this context, with this foundational document prepared for discussion and conclusion at the Congress, we are neither presenting a finished catalog of today’s realities nor sharing a “thematic” assessment limited to one or a few topics on our agenda. The 14th Congress document contains the strategic elements needed by everyone in our party who asks, “What are we doing?”. The determination and answering of the most vital questions for us in 2024 should be seen as a strategic choice in itself. We start from there and update our roadmap according to these choices.
B. Palestinian Resistance and Israeli Aggression following October 7
Current status
1. The series of attacks launched by Hamas against Israel on October 7 should be seen as an example of the resilience and creativity of a people being forced to their knees and increasingly driven to annihilation. The possibility that some states might have provided intelligence or logistical support for the operation does not change this reality. Even if this unproven possibility is set aside, the Palestinian operation, conducted under limited resources and siege conditions, has left the arrogant Israeli state, which legitimizes all forms of injustice, lies, and barbarism in the name of sacredness, in a state of desperation.
2. While it is clear that there were civilians among those killed during the operation and that Hamas militants were not particularly selective in this regard, it is equally true that some of the Israeli citizens who died were shot by the Israeli army and police. The settlements targeted in the operation are areas where the crimes committed by Israel against the Palestinian people are witnessed daily, and where “civilian” life is only possible through moral decay. Furthermore, the aggression of the state of Israel has reached dimensions that necessitate a reckoning for all the citizens of that country.
3. Those who condemn the October 7 operation by pointing to the scale of the indiscriminate massacre initiated by Israel in Gaza immediately afterward fail to understand that, for Palestinians, the thin line between life and death has long been blurred. Palestine as a whole, but especially Gaza, is a prison where no rules apply, and Palestinians are killed on a daily basis. However, what should be condemned here are the attempts to theorize surrender under the guise of “revenge” by the ruling classes. There was no doubt that the Israeli state would launch a brutal attack against the Palestinians. Yet those who wish for the Palestinian resistance to be limited to actions with very limited military value, symbolized by children with slingshots, should know that the resistance against occupying forces in history has always faced this dilemma. In World War II, thousands of civilians were randomly executed following the assassination of Nazi Governor of Prague Reinhard Heydrich by British-backed Czech resistance fighters and the elimination of high-ranking Nazi officer Wilhelm Kube by Soviet partisans in Minsk. There are many similar events in human history. Acting without considering the current balance of power and potential consequences is characteristic of fools, while submitting to invaders in order to avoid paying the price is the trait of cowards.
4. It is still too early to discuss all outcomes of Hamas’s action. Tens of thousands of Palestinians have been massacred, a very heavy price that humanity and especially world revolutionaries have been unable to prevent. However, we must also consider the other side of the scale. October 7 marked the beginning of a process far beyond the discrediting of the Israeli state. In its efforts to respond to Hamas, Israel is rapidly losing legitimacy and, along with it, the US-led imperialist bloc is facing an unprecedented moral questioning. Moreover, there is no indication that the Palestinian resistance has been militarily broken. It can even be said that Israeli aggression is weakening the Israeli state in some aspects rather than Hamas, which is not only an armed force but also a serious social and political actor.
5. Since October 7, the increase in support for Hamas in both Gaza and the West Bank, where Israel stepped up harassment and violence through army and illegal Jewish settler outposts, indicates that Palestinians are aware of the historical consequences of the October 7 operation. Unlike the Palestinian administration, corrupted by corruption and international balances, Hamas, independent of its ideological and class character, has established an administrative style in Gaza that prioritizes solidarity, becoming the protector of poor Palestinians while also managing to be the main force challenging Israeli aggression. Given its current ideological background, it should not be surprising that we refer to Hamas, which could be a counter-revolutionary organization under different conditions or conjunctures, as a resistance organization today. In history, many political movements or individuals that did not show a significant change in their internal dynamics oscillated between revolution and counter-revolution or legitimacy and illegitimacy from a broader perspective. For instance, the sympathy created by Saddam Hussein, who could be described as a public enemy tyrant before the US invasion of Iraq, is not related to emotionality but rather to the historical legitimacy of the struggle against occupation. Communists have the working class patriotism enough to recognize the historical legitimacy of the fight against occupation. However, it is also clear that Hamas, which today appears as the leading force of resistance in Palestine and in the eyes of the international arena, may in the near future adopt a reactionary and counter-revolutionary positioning. Such a change will depend on the internal dynamics of Palestine, the development of the Palestinian revolutionary movement, the moves of the imperialist countries and Israel, and the choices of Iran, which has a great influence on Hamas.
6. TKP, which has no hesitation in considering Hamas a resistance organization today, is obviously not pleased with the hegemony of Islamist organizations in the Palestinian resistance. There are several reasons for the internal dynamics of the Palestinian resistance to change in this direction. While our party politically supports the ongoing struggle in Palestine and thus Hamas, it also continues its efforts on an international and regional scale in order for the revolutionary vein in Palestine to regain strength and become the dominant element. In this context, it should not be forgotten that all Palestinian revolutionary organisations have joined the resistance in Gaza in cooperation with Hamas to the extent of their strength.
7. The Palestinian policy of the AKP government is as hypocritical in terms of its multifaceted relations with Israel (despite all rhetoric and decisions) as it is genuine in terms of the support given to Hamas and similar organizations. There is a great rivalry over religious movements in the Islamic geography. However, this competition does not eliminate the kinship between the different branches of political Islam and the fact that they address the same segments of society. The fact that the AKP sees the Palestinian issue as a lever to gain weight in the Islamic geography will lead us to a healthy conclusion only if this kinship is recognised. This pragmatism actually applies to all Islamist actors in the region. Some of these actors have distanced themselves from the Palestinian resistance, while some, like Hamas, conduct their struggle with Israel with the aim of being recognized, engaged with, and becoming partners of the US and its allies. In this regard, there has been no significant change in the AKP’s strategy of “marketing the Muslim Brotherhood to the US,” which became more evident especially during the “Arab Spring” process. It can be said that the US and its European allies, who cannot radically reassess their relations in the Middle East at the expense of Israel’s interests, are becoming increasingly aware that their Israel-centered policies are putting them in a difficult position in the Middle East. The timing and progression of Hamas’s attack have also created an advantageous scenario for this “negotiating” stance.
8. The explicit support given to Israel by the US and its allies, despite widespread public backlash in their own countries, stems from the class nature of the Palestinian issue. We cannot explain how around 15 million people worldwide who identify themselves as Jewish (even if we include those who conceal their identity) can influence the policies of great powers so significantly, either through conspiracy theories or through the cultural, artistic, scientific, and intellectual contributions that Jews have made to humanity throughout history. Over the course of time, Jews become a nation with a very weak proletarian character. In Israel, the bearer of Zionist policies, the majority of the working class consists of Palestinian Arabs, who make up one-fifth of the population. Jews have a significant presence within the capitalist class in many countries, especially the US (including Turkey). It is clear that Palestinians, with a population close to that of the Jews, do not have such an influence on the world economy. On the contrary, the essence of Palestine is shaped by the working people, not by wealthy and property-owning Palestinian families, a limited number of Palestinian capitalists, or corrupt bureaucrats. Today, while social support for the Palestinian resistance is increasing in the US, the acceleration of pro-Israel lobbying activities by the property-owning classes is a product of both the significant presence of Jews within the capitalist class and a class-driven motive. In this context, it is wrong to explain the support coming to Israel from imperialist countries as having religious or ethnic grounds.This reality that we face today in no way devalues the enormous contribution made by Jewish workers and intellectuals throughout history to the emergence and development of revolutionary thought and movement in many countries; Jewish workers exploited in different regions of the world can in no way be made complicit in the crimes of international capital.
9. The only condition for advancing the Palestinian struggle with a revolutionary, communist perspective is through interventions that grasp this class basis. It should be expected that a struggle confined to the realm of national liberation against a state shaped by religious foundations like Israel would naturally acquire a religious character. It is clear that a struggle between Jews and Muslims will not yield a “healthy” outcome; on the contrary, it will condemn both sides to fundamentalist ideologies. In this sense, while the conditions for addressing the Palestinian issue in a class-based manner have objectively matured, we are currently in a period where the labor movement globally and regionally is relatively weak, making it difficult to achieve results.
10. The tendency of revolutionary movements to adopt minimalist positions under the pressure of essential themes like democracy, peace, independence, and secularism, thus distancing themselves from the relevance of socialism, has facilitated the rise of Islamist movements. Ironically, as revolutionaries weakened and religious or ethnic movements gained prominence, this preference strengthened further. However, the only strategy that can end the division of impoverished masses in the Middle East, and thus steer them away from endless wars and conflicts, is a socialist power perspective. It is not the culture of cooperation and reconciliation between classes that will transcend and render ethnic and religious identities insignificant, but class antagonism.
11. It is clear that the recent shift of some bourgeois states from unconditional support for Israel to a more equitable stance on the Palestinian issue is not the result of a moral awakening. It should be known that public pressure in these countries is not the primary reason for this change. Many European countries are in pursuit of creating opportunities to gain economic-political influence in Palestine and, by this way, the whole Arab geography in the upcoming period. It is evident that efforts should be made to prevent this change in attitude from creating new illusions and optimism among the people of the region.
Tasks of the party
12. The Communist Party of Turkey embarks on an effort far beyond its previous endeavors to contribute to the consolidation of revolutionary forces in the Middle East, where religious ideologies and ethnic identities obscure deep poverty, imperialist aggression, and class contradictions. This mission is defined by reasons that go beyond the general obligations of internationalism. The increasing regional influence of Turkish capitalism, particularly during the AKP years, and the ideological-political expansion we define as Neo-Ottomanism, impose special responsibilities on Turkey’s communists’ shoulders. This influence, which has an unavoidable and complex impact not only on Islamist political movements but also on all significant social and political forces, needs to be comprehensively understood. Additionally, creating a sound ideological ground in the struggle against regional reaction, imperialist aggression, and the exploiting classes is vital for our responsibilities within Turkey.
13. The Communist Party of Turkey undertakes this mission with the responsibility of struggling in a country that possesses one of the most developed working classes in the region. Being aware of Turkey’s importance does not in any way justify a haughty or condescending view towards other friendly forces in the region. TKP adopts a constructive and modest stance in all its international relations, not because it appears relatively “weak” in certain indicators such as elections, but because communist ethics demand it. However, more can be said when it comes to the Middle East. The Middle East is a region of occupations, coups, massacres, wars, and migrations. In this region, every revolutionary entity has gone through significant difficulties, complex tasks, and unique tragedies. The full burden of imperialist barbarism has descended upon this region, with the impoverished peoples continuously confronting myriad forms of darkness. Without neglecting for a moment a critical perspective and the defense of the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, it is essential to create an environment by opening channels for healthy and patient communication with all progressive-revolutionary forces, except those knowingly serving the bourgeoisie, imperialism, and reactionism. Unlike other regions, the Middle East does not have the appropriate conditions for a revolutionary communist line to sever itself completely and move towards an absolute separation from other progressive forces. Instead, it is necessary to create a ground for healthy communication, discussion, and solidarity, and to strengthen the communist movement on this ground. The Party takes steps in this direction.
14. The Palestinian agenda is evaluated as an appropriate channel to strengthen communication among revolutionaries in the Middle East. TKP, within its means, hosts meetings and conferences to bolster interaction among revolutionary forces in the region and dedicates more space to the region in its publishing and news activities. The party takes necessary steps for increasing the number of comrades proficient in regional languages, especially Arabic, and raising experts on Middle Eastern countries among the Party members. Representatives of friendly parties from Palestine and Israel are invited to Turkey, and various events are organized.
15. The Communist Party of Turkey develops tools to enhance communication and solidarity with Palestinians in Turkey. It helps them overcome legal, economic, and social challenges. By including Palestinians in Turkey more in the solidarity agenda with the Palestinian people in District Houses and with various activities or actions.
16. TKP engages in political, ideological, and cultural interventions to influence Jews in Turkey to free themselves from the influence of Zionist ideology and the moral responsibility of Israel’s increasingly genocidal aggression. It follows the lobbying activities of the Jewish capital. TKP identifies the sources and agents of Israeli state propaganda, which has become effective among broad social segments, including the left, since October 7, and fulfills its duty to enlighten and warn the public against them. In addition, it opposes the targeting of Jews in Turkey and anti-Semitism.
17. Like many other communist parties, TKP supports the 1967 borders, the two-state solution, and a solution with East Jerusalem as the capital. However, TKP does not absolutize this solution, which does not mean ultimate liberation for Palestinian workers. The course and successes of the Palestinian resistance, the development of the class movement in the region, and international balances may bring other priorities or goals to the agenda. In this sense, while always giving great respect and importance to Israeli communists who are conducting an extraordinarily valuable struggle under very difficult conditions, the Communist Party of Turkey takes into account that the right of the Israeli state, which has increasingly become nothing but barbarism and turned into both a decay and an existential problem for the entire world, to exist may be questioned under certain conditions.
18. Beyond all these evaluations, approaches, and responsibilities, it is an obligation for TKP to strengthen solidarity with the Palestinian people and give this solidarity a revolutionary content.
C. Turkish foreign policy under the shadow of the war in Ukraine
Current status
1. The ongoing war in Ukraine should be seen as a new phase of internal contradictions and conflicts within the imperialist system. All military/political interventions carried out by the United States in various parts of the world, by gathering its allies to counteract the erosion of its hegemony both economically and politically, encounter resistance from different actors. Evaluating this resistance solely within the context of “action-reaction” and seeing it within the legitimate defense boundaries against US aggression would mean failing to grasp the logic of the imperialist-capitalist system. Viewing today’s conflicts as an extension of the resistance and successes of the working masses and oppressed peoples against US imperialism from the past to the present is also a great oversimplification. While revolutionary positioning and resistance create problems for imperialists and tensions and conflicts arising from competition within the imperialist system interact with each other, they develop on completely different foundations.
2. The starting point of the conflicts currently unfolding in Ukraine today is the counter-revolution that resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The socialist character of the Soviet Union (USSR), which created a common Soviet society in equality, brotherhood, and peace among different nations and ethnic groups constituting the 15 Republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), cannot be separated from the principles regulating relations among them. Policies implemented after the October Revolution of 1917 for the resolution of national issues, which matured over time, could only succeed in a social-political order where the working class held power and centralized planning was valid. In this sense, the fact that those who blame the Bolsheviks and the Soviet era for the problems arising during the dissolution of the USSR, even questioning whether Ukrainians are a distinct nation proves that this distortion has both a political and an ideological dimension. Nations emerge not based on racial characteristics but as products of complex economic, cultural, and political dynamics within historical development.
3. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cannot be reduced to the disappearance of a multinational state centered around Russia. The collapse of the USSR signifies the loss of humanity’s most significant achievement towards establishing a classless and exploitation-free society across a vast geography. In this regard, it is evident that capitalist Russian Federation today has material limitations in acting as the successor of the USSR. There can be no USSR without Soviets and socialism, and no demagogy can create such a perception of the USSR. The October Revolution of 1917, carried out under the leadership of the Russian proletariat, and Russia being the most important republic of the Soviet Union in almost all criteria, do not change the fact that certain republics, especially Ukraine, stood out particularly in providing a basis for counter-revolutionary elements, especially after the revolution and particularly during the Second World War. There is no difference between Russia and Ukraine in terms of the legacy of the USSR.
4. As much as the Russian Federation, emerging as one of the “independent” countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, deserves to be recognized as a sovereign country, Ukraine deserves it equally. Our approach to the new political entities emerging after the counter-revolution, which reached its final consequences in 1991, is condemned to remain a moral stance unless it gives weight to a revolutionary class movement that will restore the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and socialist countries in Europe have collapsed, giving rise to numerous capitalist states in this region. It is meaningless today to classify political entities in Soviet territories or in Yugoslavia as legitimate or illegitimate. In this sense, there is no basis for Russia’s claim that there is no separate Ukrainian state reality.
5. It is a fact that the developments accompanying the “color revolution” in Ukraine in 2014 paved the way for the current war. Since that time, Ukraine has entered a period where fascist movements, found both in the aftermath of 1917’s civil war and during the German occupation in World War II, have been fully liberated. This move, managed by NATO as part of the encirclement plan of Russia, took advantage of the climate of uninterrupted decay created by the counter-revolution of 1991 and the successive governments that followed. In this sense, there is no meaning in romanticizing or approving the pre-2014 period in Ukraine. On the contrary, what has happened is a clear proof that capitalism cannot coexist with concepts like peace, brotherhood, stability, and justice. The turmoil culminating in another counter-revolutionary coup in Ukraine in 2014 was the result of a profound crisis that could have been resolved with revolutionary power by an organized working class. The fact that this crisis was capitalized upon by the US and its allies should not lead to a misconception about its origins.
6. The argument that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a legitimate response to NATO’s move should be questioned due to the character of the ruling class in the Russian Federation and its uninterrupted responsibility for the destruction of the historical achievements of the USSR since 1991. However, reducing this annexation to an imperialist expansion practice is also not correct. As mentioned, the socialist character of the USSR allowed for choices in shaping the borders of its constituent Republics that could cause problems under different conditions. The successive emergence of border disputes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the conflicts leading to wars, as seen in the case of Azerbaijan-Armenia, are products not of arrangements in solving national issues in the USSR, but of the irrationality of capitalism. Explaining these aftershocks solely through imperialist conflicts of interest would underestimate the place the USSR held internationally and the vacuum created by its demise. Today, the border disputes involving former Soviet republics, primarily Russia, stem from the fact that the legacy of the USSR, which had resolved the national question, has been inherited by capitalist countries that create national problems.
7. As a Marxist-Leninist party, TKP evaluates international developments not with templates but through process analysis. In this sense, it takes into account the specificities originating from the USSR in the internal dynamics of the Russian Federation after 1991. Unlike other capitalist countries, Russia was established on the rapid abolition of public property. The existence and expansion of commodity economy in the USSR before 1991 does not change this reality. While capitalism in Russia quickly created a strong and ambitious bourgeoisie, its horizons was limited by the opportunities that the US and European imperialists would create for Russia internationally. NATO countries thwarting this expectation should be explained not by their ill will or hypocrisy but by the nature of imperialism. Similarly, it was not possible for a capitalist country as large as Russia, with unique resources, to be content with what the US and allies prescribed for it for long. Capital cannot thrive without expansion; capitalism cannot exist without spreading in its monopolistic stage. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Russian Federation cannot be seen solely in the context of legitimate defense against attacks by the US and NATO. Just as we talk about attempts by Russian imperialism to counteract moves by the US, we can also talk about attempts by the US and its allies to limit the influence that Russia tries to create.
8. The war in Ukraine can be seen as a new phase in this equation. Aside from NATO’s expansion eastwards, it is clear that it fundamentally targets Russia. It is inconceivable that the hegemonic crisis plaguing the United States for decades would not want to halt the positions Russia has begun to secure in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, which have caused turmoil and tensions within the imperialist hierarchy. Eventually, Russia’s acquisition of these positions through economic, trade means, and in “peace” becomes insignificant. The pursuit of new markets, investment areas, cheap labor, raw material sources, and energy routes inevitably carries the possibility of evolving into armed conflict. It is evident in imperialist conflicts that each side generates excuses to justify its position. Even Nazi Germany felt the need to justify its aggression up to a point. Therefore, before evaluating whether the reasons Russia puts forward for its actions, including the occupation of Ukrainian territory, are justified, it is necessary to question the foundations of the social system and political power currently prevailing in Russia. Capitalist exploitation cannot be justified anywhere, particularly in a region that was dominated by socialism for over 70 years. The transition from a period where jungle laws prevailed and the wealth created by the Soviet people was ruthlessly looted to a more controlled stage where the weight of the state is felt does not make a difference in this regard. The current socio-economic order in Russia, which the Russian state tries to downplay by bending historical truths and exploiting the cultural characteristics of Russian society, continues to be the basis for inequality, poverty, and corruption.
9. The claim that Russian armed forces entered Ukraine without any justification or provocation is another distortion. In many wars throughout history, it has remained unclear who fired the first shot, and the parties have blamed each other. The truth is that NATO has been effectively using many countries, especially Poland and Ukraine, to pressure and provoke Russia for a long time. The same can be said for the conflicts that have escalated in Donbass and Luhansk since 2014. The tension created by the steps taken by the USA and its allies to encircle Russia and Russia’s effort to keep the former Soviet Republics under its control had led to hot conflict even before the war in Ukraine (as in the case of Georgia). It is insufficient to explain all these events with the geo-strategic priorities and security concerns of the countries. In the final analysis, the differing interests of different capital powers lie in the background of wars and foreign policy initiatives.
10. In the ongoing war in Ukraine, the United States is acting with goals such as reducing the European Union’s ability to act independently, breaking Russia’s dominance in the continent’s energy markets and enhancing its share in the market, continuing NATO’s expansion, and wearing down Russia in a long-term conflict. It could be argued that the U.S. administration has largely succeeded in achieving these goals, despite risking Ukraine becoming a wrecked and thoroughly corrupt state. The conflict in Ukraine has deepened crisis topics within the European Union, driven much of Europe into thoughtlessness and fanaticism regarding anti-Russian sentiment, seen increases in military spending as desired by the U.S., and prompted many European countries to turn to expensive liquefied gas from the U.S. instead of Russian natural gas. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO in a relatively short period, and excluding Kaliningrad, which has no land connection with the Russian Federation, the number of NATO countries on the Russian border has increased to four. However, having vast resources, Russia has not been as worn down in the war as the U.S. had expected. The Putin administration has managed to maintain political stability domestically, and despite extensive sanctions, the Russian economy has not plunged into a deep crisis. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the use of resources to continue the war in Ukraine, along with the additional burden of financing Israeli aggression, has become a serious political crisis headline in the U.S. on the eve of presidential elections.
11. Let alone reversing the course of the war, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Ukraine to maintain the current status quo, and the pressure on the Zelensky administration to reach an agreement is mounting. Additionally, the possibility of a change in leadership in Ukraine, which Russia has been advocating since the beginning, has become a strong likelihood due to some NATO member countries seeking alternative solutions. Opposition in the country has been completely suppressed, and although elections have been postponed, Zelensky’s ability to persuade and govern the society is rapidly declining. It is obvious that the counter-attack in Kursk, on Russian territory, will not radically change this picture. The cost of the insistence by some countries, led by the UK and the US, to keep Ukraine in the war is also increasing. It is apparent that Russia aims to translate its gains in the war into an agreement that would lead to a relative thaw with NATO. Contrary to the claims of the Ukrainian administration and NATO officials, it is a fact that the Russian army has not used its firepower to an extent that would make such an agreement impossible and has targeted specific objectives. Despite this sensitivity, it is clear that there are elements that make an agreement as difficult as those that facilitate it. The expansion of the war’s scope is another possibility that should not be underestimated.
12. The AKP government has always maintained its ability to sustain relationships with all parties in the Ukraine crisis and has greatly benefited from the advantages created by this position. It is evident that Turkey, which has not been part of the sanctions imposed on Russia and has instead become a primary outlet for both Russian companies and citizens since the start of the war, has not faced as much opposition from the US and other NATO countries as might have been expected. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that the US administration has encouraged Turkey, as a NATO member, to maintain relationships with both warring countries simultaneously. Undoubtedly, the “understanding” shown towards Turkey within NATO is fundamentally based on the recognition that it is practically impossible for Turkey to sever its economic ties with Russia. Additionally, these relations also help the West continue its trade with Russia through Ankara.
13. Under current conditions, it is impossible to end Turkey’s dependency on Russia for natural gas and oil supplies. When we add coal and iron-steel imports to this, we encounter the fact that Russia is the most important supplier of essential raw materials for Turkish industry. We must not forget that Russia is also the most important source for wheat, even though it is less problematic to procure it from other countries. Considering all these factors, we can foresee that a disruption in relations between the two countries would create serious problems. Moreover, this relationship is not one-sided. Even though Turkey’s trade with Russia always results in a deficit, the mutual importance of exporting fruits and vegetables, chemical products and derivatives, machinery and parts, automotive, and electrical-electronic goods to Russia becomes evident, especially considering the sanctions imposed on Russia. One of the countries where Turkish capital is most established and Turkish contractors receive the most work is Russia. This is further complemented by the fact that Russian tourists contribute to one-tenth of Turkey’s total tourist revenue.
14. It has been observed that the US, which has tolerated the continuation of long-standing economic relations between Turkey and Russia during the war, is increasing its pressure on Turkey, primarily on the banking system, to prevent Russia from developing economic and financial ties beyond its current relations with Turkey due to its dwindling options. Both large companies and the state bureaucracy have indeed retreated under this pressure. At a time when the struggle between those who want to further develop relations with the US and those advocating a more negotiating stance is intensifying, Russia has started working on new options and taking concrete steps in this direction due to the increasing and effective pressures. However, it should also be noted that the economic relations between Russia and Turkey help European capital maintain its direct or indirect ties with Russia, and this situation strengthens Turkey’s position in the face of U.S. pressures.
15. Beyond Turkey’s much-publicized supply of UAVs and armed drones, economic relations with Ukraine, which include the sale of various military materials such as armored vehicles and artillery systems, were significantly developing in sectors such as construction, telecommunications, glassware, and food products before the war, even if they were not as extensive as those with Russia. With the war, there has been a noticeable trend among some companies in Turkey’s rapidly growing arms sector to undertake production initiatives in Ukraine, as well as moving beyond grain imports and fruit-vegetable exports to agricultural land leasing and major food investments. However, the main goal of the Turkish bourgeoisie is to secure a significant share in the reconstruction and infrastructure investments of the settlements left on the battlefield, regardless of how the war ends. The fact that many companies are already active in this regard will provide Turkish capital with significant advantages in the competitive environment that will emerge.
16. The war in Ukraine has facilitated Turkey’s ability to better manage the problematic aspects of its relations with NATO and specifically with the US. It is evident that the US administration has been more tolerant towards Turkey’s relations with Russia and its tendency to act autonomously in several regions. In this context, both US imperialism and Turkey have limited options. The distance Turkey’s capitalism can maintain from the “West” is limited, and those limits have been reached recently. The US, aware that it no longer possesses its former strength, realizes that more than threats and blackmail are needed to keep Turkey within the alliance system. The Russian Federation does not expect Turkey to break away from NATO but rather to adopt a stance that will weaken NATO’s internal cohesion. For Russia, seeking an agreement with NATO, Turkey’s presence in NATO is a significant opportunity. The AKP’s growing interest in the expanding BRICS should also be considered in this context. Although it is seen as an element that can strengthen its hand in foreign policy and provide new economic opportunities, it seems unlikely that BRICS will compensate for the uncertainty in relations with the EU, which has entered a serious political crisis following the last European Parliament elections, in the short term.
17. The upcoming presidential election in the U.S. will have significant consequences not only for the internal dynamics of the U.S. but also on the international stage. If one of the presidential candidates, Trump, is elected, it is likely that he will exacerbate social tensions surrounding the Palestinian issue to a breaking point. Regardless of whether the U.S. working class and revolutionary actors are prepared for political and social upheaval, the entry of the dominant imperialist country into a chaotic process will create new opportunities and issues for communists worldwide. It has likely been evident over the past few years that Trump’s racist, conservative, religious, and fascist rhetoric has not made the Democrats and their candidate, Harris, more preferable. The warnings by the Communist Party of Turkey during the previous U.S. elections about the Biden administration leading to new conflicts in our region have unfortunately been confirmed quickly. The U.S. is one of the most concrete proofs that searching for “friends” within the bourgeois camp is unnecessary. Nonetheless, TKP will closely monitor the new developments that may arise from the U.S. election results and will not remain indifferent to their impacts on our region and country.
18. Evaluating Turkey’s foreign policy multidimensionality solely in the context of relations with Russia is not correct. In the past, Turkey had more comprehensive relations with the Soviet Union compared to other NATO members. As a product of mutual necessities, the two neighboring countries with different social systems exhibited what could roughly be described as a careful attitude towards each other. Today, however, what guides Turkish foreign policy is the development level of Turkey’s capitalism and the expansionist drive of the Turkish bourgeoisie. This drive is one of the factors that brought the AKP to power. It should not be forgotten that the aggressive turn towards the European Union in the 2000s was driven not only by a quest for stability but also by the capitalist class sensing opportunities and the belief that new initiatives could be developed within or alongside a union grappling with various internal issues. The Customs Union agreement, for example, was absolutely detrimental to the Turkish public but turned into a significant expansion channel for some segments of the capitalist class.
19. Even during the years when the AKP government appeared most enthusiastic about the EU, Turkish capitalism, proportionate to its power, opened up new areas in different directions and diversified its points of connection. The schools established by the Gulenists during this period facilitated the integration into state bureaucracies in many countries, creating numerous job opportunities. The presence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), often under the guise of military training and humanitarian aid, developed in parallel with these schools, and the rapid expansion of Turkish Airlines’ flight routes became an important instrument of this expansion. The concept of Neo-Ottomanism, systematically and comprehensively introduced by TKP for the first time in relation to the AKP era, activated the ideological and cultural elements needed for the expansion and dissemination of Turkish capitalism. While attacking the foundations and achievements of the Republic, AKP quickly socialized the thesis that Turkey has an imperial legacy and succeeded in making this thesis the official state ideology. Islamism and, when necessary, Turkism, strengthened Turkey’s presence in the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus, Asia, and the Balkans. In Latin America, where such ideological-cultural proximity could not be established, the approach was based on the image of “solidarity with the oppressed” and “the great just power that protects.”
20. The European Union, which is of vital importance for Turkish capitalism, is not only an important agenda of Turkish foreign policy but also one of the main determinants of those policies. The European Union, especially Germany, which remains the dominant actor in Turkey’s economic relations, is also an imperialist power with deep political, ideological, cultural and military ties and connections in our region and Turkey. The room for manoeuvre and bargaining power that Turkish capitalism has gained in recent years has in no way closed the channels of intervention of prominent imperialist countries such as Britain, Germany and France. On the contrary, these countries can be more influential in Turkey than the USA on some issues. It is pointless to expect that the ongoing tensions that have led to the loosening of the European Union in recent years will lead these countries to withdraw their claims against Turkey. On the contrary, it should not be forgotten that the chaos in the international arena, which has deeply affected almost all countries, has made the dominant imperialist countries more aggressive, and that Germany has made a great leap forward in recent years in terms of armament and military presence across borders.
21. The future evolution of the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Palestine will be determined not by the decisions of individual parties but by the complex relationships, tensions, and struggles involved. However, no matter what happens, capitalism will continue to produce new conflicts and wars. One potential conflict area is Iran, which is in friction with Turkey due to regional ambitions for a number of reasons. As one of the few powers engaged in the struggle for influence and hegemony in the Islamic world, Iran is constantly in conflict with Turkey in tension points such as Iraq, the Caucasus, and Syria. While the rivalry between the two countries does not currently have the intent or capacity to escalate into direct conflict, any step taken by the bloc led by the U.S. in this direction would create significant turbulence in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. In this context, it should also be noted that the AKP has recently been able to intervene more in Iran’s internal political balances.
22. It is evident today that Turkish capitalism is experiencing the pains of trying to become an imperialist power. The gaps emerging in the world and in the region where Turkey is located have helped the expansion of the Turkish bourgeoisie, yet the structural vulnerabilities of Turkish capitalism, despite changing form, have not been overcome. Nonetheless, it is clear that Turkish capitalism is neither as distorted and insignificant as liberals claim, nor as dependent and victimized as some believe. As a mid-level developed capitalist country, Turkey is an economic, political, and military power that should not be underestimated. As in other countries, the strategic orientations of this power are not solely determined by the needs of big capital. Although its class character is evident, the presence of a state strategy that can sometimes go beyond the concrete interests of capital is not unique to Turkey. The state’s ability to defend the interests of the ruling class depends on not being strictly subordinated to those interests. However, in a capitalist country, the state cannot establish a direction that permanently contradicts the interests of the capital class. For example in Turkey, even though the security-oriented domestic and foreign policies often create tensions with the expectations and priorities of the capitalist class, ultimately, these policies are shaped in accordance with the interests of capital. One of the most typical examples of this is the Syrian policy. After openly engaging in a struggle for regime change in Syria, sending troops to this country, and controlling a certain region while gradually establishing its own institutions there, the AKP government’s explanation of all this under the guise of “national security” is meaningless. The primary justification for military operations conducted by all countries worldwide is “security.” If we are to use this concept, what is at stake is the security of the capitalist class, meeting the new investment, market, profit, labor, and raw material needs of the large monopolies.
23. In Syria, which will be the most challenging foreign policy issue for Turkey in the near future, it is impossible to return to the pre-2011 situation despite the recent optimism in the Ankara-Damascus talks in which Russia and, to some extent, Iran have dominated. The US, Russia, Iran and Turkey, let alone other countries with small-scale armed elements within Syria’s borders, have created a very serious military build-up. Israel periodically carries out air strikes in Syria, and Hezbollah, the most important armed organisation in Lebanon, has a significant presence inside Syria. The country’s oil is being plundered by foreign powers or their affiliated organisations, and the already devastated economy is further weakened by smuggling, corruption and plunder under this authority gap. Dozens of organisations, large and small, are shedding the blood of the Syrian people in line with the interests of the countries in competition and conflict, or by negotiating with those countries. One of the biggest problems of the government in Turkey is that the Syrian National Army, which has been turned into an extension of the Turkish Armed Forces, is an armed force of such a large scale that it cannot be relocated to other regions. It is possible, but very difficult, for this force to become part of the institutional network of the Syrian state. Similarly, pulling the Syrian National Army into Turkey is an option that, although it is seen as an ideological and political trump card for the government, would pose equally great risks. Nevertheless, the difficulty in ‘withdrawal of the Turkish military force’, which Syria constantly emphasises as the main condition for a solution, is not technical but economic and political. The ambitious steps taken in Syria cannot be seen as the delirium of the AKP, which uses discourses such as ‘praying in Damascus’. If Turkish capitalism has entered into an expansionist tendency under the guise of ‘National Stance’, which ideologically makes itself felt in some Republican sections in addition to AKP’s Neo-Ottomanism, the most shocking point of this has been Syria. In this sense, a retreat from Syria would mean a major damage to the regional and international ambitions of the Turkish bourgeoisie and would have serious economic consequences. Therefore, there should be no doubt that Turkey will seek some political, military and economic concessions in a possible negotiation with Syria.
24. The periodic needs and issues of Turkish capitalism make the complex relationship between the state and the capital class even more delicate. Turkish capitalism, which is undergoing the pains of becoming an imperialist power, is in dire need of a state-centric strategy in today’s unstable, even chaotic, international conditions. From the structuring of the arms industry, which is one of the sectors that every capitalist economy must prioritize while shifting towards advanced technologies, to migration policies, and from large-scale agreements requiring state participation to the exemptions and privileges granted to countries, it can be observed that state policy keeps capital groups in line in many areas. The interweaving of state bureaucracy with the capital class facilitates this form of relationship.
Tasks of the party
25. The Communist Party of Turkey rejects supporting any particular capitalist country or group of countries and defending the domestic and foreign policy practices of their bourgeois governments. It is based on the understanding that such defense, which results in nothing but postponing or removing the socialist power struggle from the agenda, damages the already ineffective process of world revolution. This approach is also applicable to the war in Ukraine.
26. It is clear that the Russian Federation has developed a more principled, understandable, and reciprocal approach in contrast to the arbitrary, bullying, unilateral, greedy, and principle- and reason-lacking policies of the US and its allies, which have incited anger among the peoples of the world. In doing so, the Putin administration has also benefited from the legitimacy and prestige of the USSR, which could never be completely eliminated by the imperialists and the Russian counter-revolution. At the same time, it is working to spread a new type of conservatism, creating ethical justifications for suppressing the rights of the working classes under the pretext of “Western intervention,” and trying to rectify the corrupt image created by the opulence and corruption of the capitalists and high-level bureaucrats who have seized enormous resources through occasional severe purges. It is not the first time in the history of imperialism that a capitalist power has emerged more capable and stronger in public opinion formation against a bloc. In this context, the Communist Party of Turkey adopts the principle of not making a distinction between good and bad bourgeois forces without taking into account the foundations of capitalist exploitation, the historical reckoning between labor and capital, and the decaying and corrupting structure of imperialism. It engages in ideological and political struggle against illusions about the Russian Federation both in Turkey and internationally.
27. The claim that the war in Ukraine will force the Russian Federation to increasingly trim its capitalist class and eventually evolve into a state-planned economy is neither scientific nor supported by current data. The war is compelling Russian capitalism towards a restructuring rather than a demise. In this process, the ideological-political debates emerging in society and the civil-military bureaucracy can only hold revolutionary significance in the presence of an independent class movement and with the rise of its vanguard party. As a party aware of the tragic outcomes of trying to pull a bourgeois government to the left, TKP continues to remind the class character of the Russian Federation while closely following the ideological-political processes in Russia that occasionally give reference to the Soviets. The Communist movement can only strengthen by engaging with these processes on behalf of the working class and from a revolutionary perspective, rather than turning its back on them.
28. Not taking sides in the contradictions and conflicts within the imperialist system does not mean maintaining an “equal distance” from all parties, which never yields healthy results in political struggle. TKP acts in accordance with the interests of the revolution and the tasks these interests highlight. In NATO-member Turkey, tainted for many years by coups, massacres, cultural interventions, intelligence activities, bases, and nuclear weapons by US, the party prioritizes the struggle against US imperialism, European Union as an imperialist union, and NATO. It avoids a mechanical stance where ideological sensitivities dictate political tasks and language. The party diligently fulfills its responsibilities in contributing to and participating in the anti-NATO actions and events organized by THTM (People’s Representatives Assembly of Turkey) this year.
29. The party closely monitors the new situation arising from the construction of Russian nuclear power plants following Russia’s dominant role in Turkey’s natural gas and oil supply, as well as the recent increased interest from China in the energy sector. The issue of energy, which concerns the rights and organization of workers in the sector and the protection of the environment, is given due importance, considering it affects the fundamental needs of our citizens, such as heating and lighting, as well as all areas of the economy. The party makes preparations from today to meet the energy needs, one of the most challenging issues for the future socialist government to be self-sufficient. It establishes an Energy Sector Monitoring Center that follows all aspects of the issue, produces solutions, and assists the Central Committee in developing means of struggle.
30. Regardless of the course of the war in Ukraine, TKP identifies the urgent task of raising the struggle against war in Turkey with new tools and preventing the entry of our country into war. The fight against war is addressed without stripping it of its class content, but by taking into account the unique aspects it encompasses. Strengthening the reactions within Turkish society against NATO, foreign military bases, weapons of mass destruction, the activities of private companies in the arms industry, the glorification of weapon systems, and militarism, and incorporating these reactions into a healthy line of struggle against imperialism, is the responsibility of the party and the Peace Committee. The reorganization of the Peace Committee in this direction is a Congress decision.
31. Nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. in Turkey, along with foreign troops and bases, are considered not only part of the struggle against these elements but also a specific issue in its own right. The immediate dismantling of these nuclear weapons, which could turn Turkey into a direct party in an imperialist war, target our people with weapons of mass destruction, and threaten regional countries, is one of the urgent goals of the peace struggle in Turkey.
32. The Communist Party of Turkey openly declares that the domestic and foreign policy practices legitimized under the name of the “Century of Turkey” or the claim of a “strong Turkey” represent the interests of the capitalist class, not our people. The party does not consent to the portrayal of the profit-seeking of a handful of exploiters as “national interest” in Turkey. It condemns interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the deployment of soldiers and bases beyond borders, and the formation of armies from jihadist mercenaries as extensions of Turkey’s capitalist expansionist ambitions. The party opposes the thesis that separates domestic and foreign policy and that considers foreign policy to be above political parties. As a patriotic party aiming for a strong Turkey, TKP declares that this goal can only be achieved with a country where the working people are in power, and which is egalitarian, secular, independent, and sovereign. TKP, founded during the National Struggle to resist imperialism, imperialist institutions, wars, and aggressions, stands against our people being made part of bloody confrontations for the interests of a handful of exploitative bosses.
33. TKP closely monitors the areas of expansion of Turkish capital not only with political interest but also with moral responsibility. It strengthens its ability, in coordination with related foreign revolutionary entities, to monitor the exploitation relations and class struggles in these countries and to intervene politically in these agendas.
34. The political and demographic dynamics in countries with a high concentration of people migrating from Turkey, whether permanently or temporarily, also become increasingly relevant to TKP. The migration trend, which includes some of TKP’s members and volunteers, continues to be a subject of ideological struggle for TKP and constitutes an important factor for its organization abroad. It is necessary for TKP’s foreign organizations to increase their political influence on the political agendas of those countries and to establish relationships with communist parties and groups in those countries in line with a strategy.
35. The party fights against those who, using the policies of the capitalist class and its governments, filled with exploitation, injustice, oppression, corruption, ignorance, and bigotry as an excuse, seek to delegitimize and portray Turkey as illegitimate. Since the period of the National Struggle, imperialist countries have been claiming and trying to justify that the foundations of the Republic of Turkey are illegitimate. It is evident that those who share this claim today have no problem with exploitation or the spread of religiosity in Turkey. TKP declares that confusing the struggle to change the system in Turkey and establish socialism with a struggle against the existence of Turkey is one of the ugliest stains on the revolutionary movement in Turkey. TKP, as a party fighting for the working class, for our people, and the real interests of this country, reiterates that it has a say in both the past and the future of this country.
D. Communism and the international arena
Current status
1. Today, we cannot speak of a world communist movement consisting of elements with a strategic partnership and moving in the same direction. This observation does not stem from an expectation of an international movement that eliminates differences and operates with homogeneous and advanced coordination. We know that communist parties can only have such a relationship and homogeneous positioning under very specific conditions. What we are referring to here is the absence of a common ground that communist parties interpret their existence upon. The emergence of certain groups of parties looking at different directions is not sufficient to define a world communist movement.
2. Nevertheless, the existence of numerous parties coming together at the International Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties (IMCWP) today holds great value. Amid the dark reality that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these meetings, largely due to the special efforts of some parties, notably the Communist Party of Greece, have become both a sign and a tool of the international presence of communist parties. However, as time progresses, the IMCWP faces not only deep ideological differences among its components but also the inability to renew the meeting format to make this platform more functional, resulting in issues of productivity and enthusiasm loss. While there is no sign in the near future that this issue will be resolved, the continuation of the IMCWP is in the interest of all member parties.
3. It is evident that the parties participating in the International Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties describe each other with various adjectives. It is natural for TKP to have certain evaluations regarding member parties and to feel close to some and distant from others. However, the idea of opening the IMCWP to non-communist forces must be rejected. While there are many platforms operating internationally under labels such as “left,” “progressive,” and “anti-imperialist,” adding a new one to these is not beneficial. On the contrary, it would be seriously problematic for a platform consisting of parties that declare their “communist” character to open itself to non-communist forces.
4. Communism has shown that it is not an actor that will disappear from the social and political plane, as some thought and hoped, following the difficult years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The diversity of subjects operating under the name of communism and the great differences between them do not change this reality. Moreover, despite everything, today in many countries of the world, communist parties with organizational roots or historical legitimacy dating back to 1917 and the revolutionary period that followed are continuing their struggles. However, on an international scale, after the collapse of the USSR, communism has not become a current option against capitalism, which is struggling to manage the deep and unsolvable problems it has created and is unable to develop a solution, even if false, for humanity, thus being in a state of perpetual crisis. The failure to fulfill this historical responsibility has paved the way for new social democratic or far-right racist movements to emerge and fade in many countries. The rise of these “false solution” parties, which drag the working masses along and then leave them in despair and helplessness, are proof of the existence of a wide space and a historical opportunity for communist parties.
5. Bold answers must be given to the question of why communism has not yet managed to appeal to the yearning of the working masses. Starting from our common history of the 20th century, the problems arising from the strategic choices of communists collectively or in individual countries must undoubtedly be evaluated in detail, and lessons must be learned. The historical cost of the cooperation policies with bourgeois parties that came to the fore in Europe starting from 1935 and the sacrifice of revolutionary opportunities to this political choice is blatantly evident. To think that the working masses in search do not realize that the heavy and indecent intervention attempt by Eurocommunism on the foundations of Marxism means waving a white flag to bourgeois dictatorship would be foolish.
6. However, today, partly due to these choices, the communist movement is facing a problem that is incompatible with its revolutionary character. In an era where the political sphere is constantly shaped by the “new fetishism” of capital, communist parties are portrayed as actors from the past who “never quite succeeded.” Undoubtedly, the massive campaigns conducted by imperialists using tremendous resources have had a significant impact on creating this perception. However, attributing today’s predicament solely to these campaigns would be to simplify and underestimate the problem. Communist parties, being among the oldest parties in many countries due to their founding dates, after long years of arduous struggles, great successes, and at times great defeats, have ultimately not yet provided a solution to humanity’s problems. This is the widespread perception. Some communist parties or “former” communists, thinking that this perception cannot be overcome, try to rise by becoming part of the “new fetishism” in bourgeois politics and competing in this field, and eventually became part of bourgeois politics. Making politics through individuals, adopting the language of popular culture, retreating from Marxism-Leninism conceptually, deforming the culture of action and organizational life to make it open to liberal forms are links in this transformation. However, the pollution created by these initiatives, which are useless except as accessories to bourgeois politics, does not eliminate the existence of the problem. Communist parties must prove that they are not outdated.
7. When they were founded and for a long period thereafter, communist parties struggled in close interaction with the dynamism created by an organized workers’ movement that always made its weight felt. The existence of a section of the working class that knew the mechanisms of exploitation, was familiar with basic Marxist concepts, had matured class consciousness, and developed a culture of action was a significant opportunity, even if the widespread influence of social democracy could not be broken. In this respect, although it varies from country to country, it must be acknowledged that a significant change has occurred today. Communism has become an external subject to the working class in many countries. Considering that trade union structures have no special assistance in this regard and cannot have any, it cannot be expected that communist parties will strengthen their class character solely by relying on historical experience. In this sense, new tools, a new language, and a revolutionary strategy that connects all these are needed. Currently, the problem of access to the working masses, including young people who are largely part of the working class or will be, is a pressing, international issue for communist parties that cannot be brushed aside. This problem cannot be overcome with the existing set of tools largely shaped by the 20th century. Reducing the issue to digitalization, the transformations in the field of communication and media, and the increasing influence of social media should be avoided, as it would pave the way for easy solutions and deformations that lead to populism.
8. In fact, what will pave the way to the solution is strategic clarity. Ultimately, the organization of the working class is not a static activity independent of time and space. Creating an attractive center that will respond to the search of the working people, bring them together towards a goal, and make them combative requires the presence of a revolutionary strategy. This strategy does not have to be carried into the social field with content embodied in party militants, but it must point in the same direction at every scale and level. Tools for organization, means of addressing, forms of struggle, etc., are shaped and detailed according to this strategy. Today, the most fundamental problem of communism internationally is the inability to form a strategy and the consequent loss of existential meaning and value. Political programs cannot replace strategic thinking. The program of a communist party is indispensable for a revolutionary strategy and thus is the exit point. A revolutionary strategy, on the other hand, is the entirety of the political, ideological, and organizational activities to be carried out to open the way to the socialist revolution. While it is expected that the programs of communist parties fighting in different countries will be similar, it is foreseeable that their strategies may differ.
9. No matter how comprehensive or detailed the struggle that communist parties wage for “democracy,” “peace,” and “independence” may be, it cannot replace a revolutionary strategy. These types of struggle topics can be an element determined in a socialist revolution process, but they cannot be the main link. This does not mean to belittle phenomena such as “democracy,” “peace,” and “independence,” but rather to remind their unique reality, freeing them from the determination of bourgeois ideology.
10. One of the issues that has most occupied communists internationally in recent times is the stance to be taken towards countries, especially the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, that distance themselves from or position themselves against the alliance system of U.S. imperialism. Two methods can be followed in approaching this issue, both of which should mutually reinforce each other. One is to subject these countries to theoretical analysis using the unique tools provided by Marxism-Leninism. We have a strong theoretical framework for crucial topics such as examining the class character of the social systems and political powers in these countries, determining their place within the imperialist system, and depicting the forms that the labor-capital contradiction takes and may take in these countries. This framework cannot be trivialized. Of course, we encounter gray areas in theoretical analysis as well. However, the existence of gray areas does not mean that Marxism can be stretched in all directions. Nevertheless, theoretical analysis alone is not sufficient to determine our approach to the issue in question. When considering countries like the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, we must complement our theoretical analysis with a current assessment related to the “interests of the world revolution.” Since Marx, class struggles have repeatedly confronted us with critical issues that challenge the limits of our theoretical framework. In moments when no template or memorized approach sufficed, communists prevented disintegration by holding tightly to Marxist-Leninist theory on one hand, and politically flexed on the other in certain topics that sometimes enriched that theory or turned into necessary exceptions. Some of these turned into open fiascos and contributed to our theoretical framework with negative examples. However, in no case could communists avoid the problems imposed by life that cannot be solved with a purely theoretical stance. For example, the rapprochement of Soviet Russia with the bourgeois power in Germany, the country closest to revolution in Europe after the October Revolution, cannot be explained solely by “theoretical” analysis. The temporary alliance of the Soviet Union with U.S. and British imperialism during the Second World War also contains similar uniqueness. In this sense, the unique possibilities that Marxism provides us for explanation and simplification do not absolve us from the responsibility of facing complex problems.
11. Theoretical discussions on fundamental issues related to the social and political systems of countries like the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and Brazil are not impossible but very difficult. No matter how far you stray from Marxism, you cannot change the fact that capital dominance prevails in these countries. Declarations of intent, political structures, the official ideology of the state, and historical backgrounds are important, but they cannot obscure the realities of the ownership of the means of production and the commodity economy. The arguments that these and similar examples have become hybrid socio-economic formations suitable for the balance of the age or that they represent a prolonged transition period to socialism or that the capitalists in these countries will be quickly eliminated from above when the time comes cannot be accepted as data from our perspective. These types of evaluations have a metaphysical content that deviates from the reach of the Marxist-Leninist tradition and also render communism, as a political movement, ineffective. In this sense, communist parties, particularly with regards to the People’s Republic of China, have no choice but to look primarily at the property relations, surplus value production, and capital accumulation processes in this country.
12. At this point, in addition to theoretical considerations, it is necessary to approach the issue from the perspective of the interests of the world revolutionary process and the strategy of communist parties fighting in capitalist countries. As we have already seen examples in Turkey, a significant number of those who argue that the future of humanity or socialism depends on the defeat of U.S. imperialism by the People’s Republic of China and even the Russian Federation are aware of the fact that they are greatly distorting Marxist theory. The desire to balance the pessimism brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the inability of the labor movement to take the initiative with large actors that have real counterparts can be understood to a point. However, what needs to be questioned here is the lack of revolutionary entities and revolutionary strategy and action in such a geostrategic alignment. In a world where large capitalist companies, multinational consortia, massive trade agreements, regular and paid armies, intelligence organizations, weapons of mass destruction, and monopolistic media exist, nothing could be more absurd than expecting communists to take pride in the market share of a Chinese company or the ballistic missiles that Russia boasts as “state of the art.” The responsibility of communist parties worldwide is to actively and organizationally involve the working masses in the struggle against exploitation, which is the source of inequalities. In this sense, it is impossible to turn the model referred to as “Chinese Socialism” into a reference and source of inspiration. TKP’s stance does not mean disinterest in the internal discussions and dynamics of the Communist Party of China, which has a tremendous accumulation of struggle, and political and ideological changes that may take place in this country.
13. This analysis does not mean that TKP approaches the international arena with certain clichés and templates. The crisis of imperialist hegemony continues, and capitalism cannot develop a model that can offer humanity hope, not even a false one. The dominance of capital in all countries is faced with deep political and ideological disarray. Under these historical conditions, which invite the revolutionary intervention of the working class, the void left by socialism, the only alternative to capitalism, has led to an increase in gray areas worldwide. The endless variations produced by competition within imperialism, the shortening lifespan of alliance systems, the expansion of the maneuvering space of actors lower in the imperialist hierarchy, and the less visible class contradictions necessitate much more meticulousness from communist parties when determining priorities and critical links in the revolutionary struggle. In this sense, the TKP will continue its approach outlined in the “Theses on Imperialism,” which became one of the party’s fundamental documents with the 2017 Conference and will be updated with a conference to be organised exclusively to address this issue in 2025. TKP will shape its political initiatives and language in accordance with its political priorities, while absolutely rejecting collaboration with the capitalist class and not compromising on the fact that the relevance of socialist revolution is a universal strategic element. On the international stage, TKP will not follow a line that equates and balances the struggle against U.S. imperialism, the European Union, and NATO with the struggle against other actors.
14. The contradictions, rivalries and conflicts within the imperialist system have different effects on the ongoing class struggles in individual countries, and communist parties may face different responsibilities and opportunities as a result of these effects. In each case, the relations between the principles of Marxism-Leninism and a socialist revolutionary perspective and the specific tasks that the contradictions within the imperialist system impose on the revolutionaries of a given country must be dealt with in a creative and revolutionary manner. Every communist party must look at the totality formed by international dynamics and the internal dynamics of individual countries from the point of view of the interests of the world revolutionary process. However, since the primary task of the communist parties is to overthrow the rule of capital in their own countries, they must approach the interests of the world revolutionary process from the perspective of their struggle for socialist power. Throughout history and today it is clear that a tension arises between the dominant needs of the world revolutionary process at the moment and the tasks posed by the revolutionary struggle in individual countries, which at times becomes difficult to resolve. There is no formula that can be applied to each of these tensions, nor is it possible to formulate a strategy by ignoring these tensions. Today, all of the hot agendas such as Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, Venezuela have to be addressed in line with the interests of the world revolutionary process, taking into account their specificities and undoubtedly from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary struggle in Turkey. Under conditions where the working class remains ineffective on the international scale and the world revolution does not make its own prominence felt conjuncturally, it is one of the most challenging tasks of this period for the communists to analyse all these topics without giving a chance to dogmatic and opportunist tendencies and to display a revolutionary positioning.
15. On the international stage, socialist Cuba deserves to be evaluated in a separate category. The resistance shown by Cuba to date, and its determination to defend the achievements of the revolution, despite the severe imperialist aggression led by the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, deserve every kind of praise. Although the economic practices conflicting with the process of socialist construction accompany this resistance and determination, which is understandable given the specific conditions of Cuba, it is a cause for concern for all communists. If the expanding private sector is not seen as a temporary retreat and is not kept under control through continuous interventions that ensure ideological vigilance, political oversight, and the determinative role of state ownership in the economy, a rupture that will eliminate the socialist character of the country will become inevitable. It appears that the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba is aware of this danger. Nevertheless, the increasing inequalities in the country invite social decay and bring with them ideological-political problems that are difficult to overcome given today’s world balance. While the TKP evaluates the NEP period in Russia with a historical point of view and with understanding, which included some elements almost impossible for a communist to stomach, even in a country with vast resources, it certainly finds the compulsory retreats of Cuba, which is besieged and isolated in many respects, legitimate and justified. Asking Cubans to be driven into hunger and deprivation with unrealistic, abstract and romantic revolutionary actions cannot only be seen as foolishness; there is also a moral issue here. On the other hand, considering the possibility that Cuba might be dragged into a capitalist restoration if adequate vigilance is not shown and striving to prevent this is the duty of every communist.
16. Communist parties in many countries are being oppressed by governments, subjected to physical attacks and bans. Often, such attacks are accompanied by accusations of serving external forces, even imperialist countries. It is not new that the regimes of capital attribute every justified reaction and struggle to “external forces’ incitement” to conceal their anti-people policies. On the other hand, it is a fact that the opposition in many countries, primarily the USA, Germany, and France, is supported, protected, and funded by other countries. It is observed that some “revolutionary,” “progressive,” or “leftist” parties or movements do not hesitate to enter into such relationships. No pressure or attack justifies receiving support from imperialist countries or entering into alliances with them. Communists must take an uncompromising stance on this issue, constantly share their red lines with the public, and not allow the slightest contamination within their ranks. Such determination is also the best response to the accusation of “serving imperialism.” Because under no pretext can communists suspend the struggle for socialism against exploitation.
Tasks of the party
17. The Communist Party of Turkey strives to strengthen Marxist-Leninist parties with a revolutionary perspective on a global scale, contributing to platforms such as the European Communist Movement (ECA) and the International Communist Review (ICR), among others, where it plays a role. It deepens relationships with friendly and fraternal parties participating in these platforms. In the same vein, it pursues regional collaborations and enhances bilateral relationships.
18. TKP continues to contribute to efforts aimed at making the International Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties more productive, maintaining relationships based on mutual respect and understanding with all parties participating in these meetings.
19. Setting aside the political movements that have become a permanent and inseparable part of mainstream politics, detached from Marxism, become instruments of any imperialist bloc or those do not harbor a revolutionary dynamism within themselves, TKP establishes relationships at different levels and contents with all parties. Taking into account that many parties are undergoing changes in one direction or another under current conditions, TKP adopts a constructive approach to understand and engage with these parties without interfering in their internal affairs, aiming for this transformation to acquire a revolutionary character. It takes steps towards the formation of healthy channels for discussion and interaction on the international stage.
20. TKP pays attention to further deepening the longstanding and evolving cooperation with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The positions gained by KKE within the working class and youth, its steadfast defense of socialism and a revolutionary perspective, its uncompromising stance on many critical issues, and its international work deserve great interest and respect. TKP is aware of some nuances between the two parties arising from the historical and social specificities of the two countries. These enrich the relationship with the KKE and make it more valuable.
21. TKP attaches great importance to the organizational and political independence of communist parties, opposes interventions by other forces against the right of communist parties to exist, and stands in solidarity with communist parties facing such interventions.
22. TKP strengthens solidarity with socialist Cuba and does its part to deepen fraternal relations with the Communist Party of Cuba. It fulfills the requirements of the cooperation protocol signed with the Communist Party of Cuba this year.
23. TKP acts with the understanding that the organizational independence of communist parties is the sole guarantee against interventions aimed at their right to exist by other powers. It is expected that communist parties will demonstrate a political and moral stance against “bribes” such as creating space in mainstream politics, obtaining seats on one level or another, or providing material resources. In this regard, TKP relies only on itself and the organized power of the working class, creates its own resources, and does not consider any position or gain that is not a product of its own struggle as a success.
24. The Congress emphasizes the need to accelerate the efforts to restructure the field of international relations as a critical element of the party’s revolutionary strategy. Given the fact that all aspects of the Political Report have an international dimension, the party maintains its external relations with a dynamic approach that aligns with the established political goals. It avoids relationship forms that are often energy-draining, formal, cumbersome, and at times turn into political tourism.
25. Within the framework of all these principles and approaches, the party intensifies its activities for communism to become a more effective movement worldwide. The 14th Congress sets the goal of developing publishing activities in this regard, emphasizing bilateral discussions, and organizing regional meetings and conferences.
E. Communist approach to Kurdish issue and our tasks
1. The Kurdish issue in its current form is the product of a historical period that includes the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The presence of the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire and other states underwent a transformation in the 1920s, and while it retained its regional character, the Kurdish issue was shaped mostly by the internal dynamics of the Republic of Turkey.
2. There are very complex reasons why the Kurds could not establish a state in the disintegration and establishment processes that followed the First World War and the October Russian Socialist Revolution. It can also be said that the establishment of the Republic of Turkey was one of the factors that prevented the establishment of a Kurdish state. However, the claim that the establishment of the Republic of Turkey meant an absolute loss in the Kurdish people’s seeking equality and freedom and that the legitimacy of this establishment can therefore be questioned is completely unfounded. The idea that the regional and even international balances that would emerge in the event of the failure of the National Struggle or its failure to be crowned with a republic would be in favor of an oppressed people is extremely subjective and ahistorical. The failure of the liberation struggle in Anatolia would have been a counter-revolutionary development that would have devastating consequences not only for the people living in our region but also for Soviet Russia and therefore for the international workers’ movement.
3. The revolutionary period that began right at the end of World War I was characterized by the mobilization of the working class in capitalist countries and their orientation towards power in many countries and the rise of national liberation movements in less developed geographies. It was certainly not possible for the shock created by these two dynamics that interacted with each other and formed the revolutionary front, especially in Europe and Asia, to be distributed equally to all points and produce similar results. Neither the Republic of Turkey nor Lausanne prevented the Kurdish nationhood, which was disrupted by the tribal structure, from overcoming the fragmentation and evolving into a state. On the other hand, it is also debatable whether Sevres, one of the agreements imposed by the imperialist bloc that won World War I, would allow for an independent Kurdish State. Even so, the Sevres Agreement is an imperialist peace initiative of an imperialist war and has zero historical legitimacy.
4. One should avoid generalized wholesale assessments of the Kurds’ relationship with the National Struggle. This meticulousness applies to all ethnic communities. The struggle in Anatolia is between reactionaries and progressives, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, patriots and collaborators. There are many elements among the Turks who are hostile to the National Struggle, especially the Palace officials and the Istanbul government. In contrast, a section of the Kurdish tribes have given open and comprehensive support to the struggle against the occupation. There is no basis for the claim that the Kurds as a whole have collaborated with British or French imperialism.
5. With the contribution of a section of the Kurdish tribes to the struggle in Anatolia, the Kurds were recognized as a founding element and gained a partial right to be represented. The reversal of these steps that marked the first term of the TBMM cannot be explained by a “deception-being deceived” relationship. It is obvious that the young Turkish bourgeoisie that left their mark on the National Struggle and the leading cadres of the movement were far from the perspective necessary to solve the national problem. In addition, the Kurdish tribal structure never provided a suitable ground for the solution of this problem. In any case, the alleviation of the Kurdish issue was only possible by dismantling the tribal structure and breaking the dominance of large landowners over the Kurdish population. The Ankara government had no such intention or power, and there was no dynamic among the Kurds aimed at disrupting the tribal structure.
6. With the government accepting the Kurdish tribal structure as it is and classifying them as pro-state and anti-state, a process that ossified the Kurdish issue was initiated. However, if bold steps had been taken to eliminate the backward structures in agriculture, as suggested by the Soviet administration and the Communist Party of Turkey at the time, and the prohibitive attitude towards the Kurdish identity/language had been abandoned, a very different result would have been achieved. The communists were of course aware of the internal problems and class-ideological limitations of the government when they made this suggestion. However, they were trying their best to encourage Ankara and bring it to a more populist line.
7. The rebellions experienced during the foundation process, although can never ve reduced to that, also included a strong objection to the denial and prohibitions against the Kurdish identity. However, these rebellions are historically behind and against the line represented by the Republic in terms of class, ideology and politics. A significant portion of these uprisings, which have a predominantly pro-Caliphate and reactionary character, have been openly supported by imperialist countries. A movement that attempts to resist the centralist moves of a bourgeois revolution led by tribal leaders by relying on reactionary ideologies and by associating with imperialist countries cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. Attempts to gloss over, trivialize or ignore the reactionary nature of these rebellions and their interaction with imperialist countries harm the Kurdish people’s search for equality. Furthermore, the theses put forward today that religion and the institution of the caliphate are the only elements that will ensure Turkish-Kurdish unity have no basis.
8. The Sheikh Said Rebellion is undoubtedly the most important of these uprisings. There are a number of reasons why a significant part of Turkish reactionism and Kurdish nationalists want to turn Sheikh Said into a taboo and present the facts about him as a fabrication of the “Kemalist history thesis.” First of all, in order to eliminate the legitimacy of the establishment of the Republic, the forces opposing him, such as Sheikh Said, must be acquitted. In this context, it is desired to create the impression that figures such as Vahdettin or Abdulhamid, against whom all the Republican cadres fought in their youth, have fallen victim to a misunderstanding and to construct a new story about them. The same applies to Sheikh Said. The fact that Sheikh Said is one of the leading figures of the Naqshbandi Order, which has been and continues to be a reactionary production center in the region, is another reason why Turkish and Kurdish reactionism take him under its wing today. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the fact that no populist-revolutionary figure came to the fore in the uprisings of the period played a role in Kurdish nationalism’s heroization of Sheikh Said.
9. The clarity regarding the class, ideological and political character of the leadership of these revolts is lacking when it comes to the leadership cadres of the young republic. As in other topics, it is seen that in such difficult issues as the abolition of feudalism and the breaking of the tribal structure, the ruling cadres experienced all the limitations and contradictions inherent in bourgeois revolutions. At the same time, these constraints and contradictions, which led to the inconsistency of the policies implemented, were not only due to the ideological and political differences between the ruling cadres, but were also the product of the structural characteristics of the increasingly strengthening capital domination. On the contrary, the fact that among the leading cadres of the Republic, who were able to develop different positions on other issues, there were no elements that gave importance to the equality of the Kurdish people, even on paper, but on the contrary, a denialist approach became the official policy, is related to these structural characteristics.
10. In a different context and years later, although the Dersim Rebellion was organized by forces opposing the central authority to protect the region’s unique tribal order and did not have a progressive character, it had some characteristics that were different from previous rebellions. The foundation period of the Republic was past and the responsibility for inequalities and injustices among citizens lied with the bourgeois government. In the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion, it was observed that the state reflexes in the Ottoman Empire were once again activated against Alevism, which was one of the factors that made the sociality open to interaction and harmony with the values of the Republic and also connected it to backward formations. No matter how understandable the efforts to break a resistance based on backward social relations in Dersim is in the historical context, the cruelty, massacre and forced migration that followed this process are never unacceptable. Respecting the deep sensitivities created by this massacre in the region and fighting against attempts to affirm this cruelty within the Republican accumulation is an absolute necessity in order not to cast a shadow on the historical legitimacy of the National Struggle and the foundation of the Republic and not to cripple the future of the Turkish revolution. Similarly, the insistence on ‘Tunceli’, which comes to the agenda as part of this historical injustice, is unacceptable. The fact that some intellectuals hail the massacre as an achievement of the Republic should be seen as a shame in itself.
11. The need for such a historical narrative in a document focused on the solution of the Kurdish issue can be explained by the fact that the Kurdish issue is also a Kurdish dynamic and that the foundations of the solution must be laid today. Today, the Republic, which is overwhelmed by the contradictions it carries and has been deliberately placed between the unity of Kurdish workers and Turkish workers, needs to be re-established through the unity of our peoples. Kurdish nationalism declares the Republic of Turkey illegitimate and claims that the Republic is basically the denial and negation of the Kurdish people. Turkish nationalism, on the other hand, keeps on the agenda, in different styles, the lie that the Republic of Turkey can only exist by bringing the Kurds to their knees, and fulfils the ‘requirements’ of this. Without gaining a foothold in the ideological-political showdown with these two nationalist approaches, the door to a solution cannot be opened. The fact that the Kurdish issue will be easily resolved under our socialist government should not be put against the fact that the socialist revolution cannot be victorious without a revolutionary class movement that ensures the unity of the workers.
12. Even though it is obvious that the nationalist groups, which portrays the Kurds as a people who have continuously served imperialist projects since the National Struggle, will not have difficulty in finding some evidence to support this distortion, this claim is baseless. A large number of Kurds participated in the armed struggle against British imperialism in a wide region in the period following the First World War, and many revolutionaries under the determination of Kurdish nationalism never gave up an anti-imperialist position throughout their lives in the subsequent periods. It should also not be forgotten that the Republic of Turkey, which was founded with the victory of the independence struggle, became part of the imperialist system in the process, and that economic-political-cultural dependency gradually strengthened. Turkey is still a member of the imperialist criminal organization NATO and is in strategic cooperation with US imperialism in many regions. Those who defend and guard the current system have no right to accuse anyone of collaboration.
13. The latest uprising, which has been ongoing in different forms since 1984, has emerged under different conditions than today. In an international environment where the Soviet Union and other socialist countries constituted a strong counterweight to the imperialist bloc, the Kurdish political movement, as an extension of the left accumulation of the 1960s and 1970s, has made a harsh intervention in the political balances of Turkey and the region. This uprising, which received great support and acceptance in the international public opinion as the most comprehensive and effective response of the period to the systematic aggression of September 12 fascism against the working class, revolutionary organizations and all freedoms, led the left, which rapidly lost its influence after the coup and whose ties with the country were weakened due to the reaction to the September 12 brutality, to recover by holding on to a “separatist” movement. On the other hand, both the fact that regional balances did not allow a separatist program to be implemented and that many cadres of the Kurdish movement had a character of belonging to Turkey and the working class, led to uncertainty about the movement’s goals and an internal struggle that deepened from time to time.
14. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increase in the US’s ability to intervene created a new regional climate that affected all Kurdish political subjects. The calming of the last rebellion within the state through negotiations and the emergence of the idea of using the Kurdish card in the regional openings of Turkish capitalism coincide with this period. However, since neither the state nor the PKK were ready for such an update, this search was followed by a bloody period in which violence spread to Turkey’s major cities and many murders with known perpetrators were categorized as “unknown perpetrators.” While it was observed that the Kurdish movement established relations with the Turkish revolutionary movement and made attempts for a Turkish solution in the first half of the 1990s, it was seen that the US and European imperialist countries took more initiative to evaluate the Kurdish issue in line with their own interests.
15. During this period, which was extremely critical in terms of the orientation of the Kurdish movement, our party, on the one hand, displayed a solidarity attitude against the attacks on HADEP executives, buildings and publications, and on the other hand, made efforts to the extent of its possibilities to form an alliance on an axis against privatization, reactionism and imperialism. The main reason why these efforts yielded a concrete result with the establishment of the Labor, Peace and Freedom Bloc in 1995 was the existence of a tendency within the Kurdish movement that was sensitive to these principles.
16. One reason why the Kurdish movement became more open to liberal and Islamist influences after the 1995 elections and was more willing to establish relations with imperialist countries was that the Turkish socialist movement did not have the power to match the weight that the Kurdish movement carried in real politics and the international arena. The Kurdish movement, which attempted to solve this problem by creating a “left” that was attached to it and affiliated with it, dragged a significant portion of the Turkish left into a deadlock that still affects it today. However, the main reason why the Kurdish movement adopted an extremely pragmatic attitude on topics such as imperialism, capitalism, and reactionism was its insistence on remaining a national movement by delaying class separation. However, in our age, it is impossible for a national movement to represent politically and ideologically the capitalist class and the workers at the same time. Therefore, the ideological orientations of the Kurdish movement have changed in parallel with the strengthening of its bourgeois character.
17. Our party does not approach this process with a preconception alien to Marxism, such as the “rightness of the oppressed nation,” but with a historicist perspective. The methods it uses, beyond the extremely problematic positions in current politics, cannot represent the Kurdish people in terms of class and ideology, but regarding a political line that still receives serious support from our Kurdish citizens, TKP makes its own independent assessment, does not use the language preferred by others, and does not fall under the determination of this or that sensitivity.
18. From the perspective of TKP, opposition to imperialism, the system of exploitation and religious reactionism are not principles that can be relaxed. It is also impossible to withdraw these principles in the name of freedoms or democracy. Therefore, TKP has closed the agenda of cooperation and alliance with the Kurdish movement and has turned to the organization of the Kurdish poor, which is an important topic in the struggle of the working class in Turkey.
19. However, the TKP cannot remain indifferent to the fact that the current order does not tolerate its own boundaries and rules when it comes to “Kurds” and closes the political arena to parties and individuals who define themselves as Kurds. The party closures, widespread arrests and trustee practices do not stem from “terrorism-related” as claimed. The issue is related to the congestion in all the fundamental problem headings of the current order. This social order, which impoverishes the vast majority of the population, is extremely fragile and does not know what to do with the “Kurdish phenomenon”, which is a reality of this country. The approach of Kurdish nationalism that “a country that does not make room for us should not exist” and the approach of Turkish nationalism that “there is no place here for a Kurd who does not kneel” point to an unsolvable problem. The solution will obviously come with the change of this fragile and unjust order.
20. The Communist Party of Turkey has a clear stance against Neo-Ottomanist policies that feed on the regional and international expansion tendency of Turkish capitalism. The party refuses to place the competition created by the pursuits of Kurdish capital in Iraq and Syria, which is trying to crack its shell with these policies, within the equation of the oppressor nation and the oppressed nation. Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and Syria and Neo-Ottomanist policies carried out by the AKP simultaneously feed the dynamics of cooperation and conflict. The Kurdish regional government in Syria, which has consolidated itself with the protection and support of the USA for today, was previously a close ally of Ankara in the international operation carried out to overthrow the central government in Syria. Moreover, the Kurdish movement was about to undertake a task such as facilitating Turkey’s regional openings in the “resolution process.” This common mission was at the source of the rhetoric that is still being voiced today regarding the unifying role of Islamism. Our party has a wholesale approach to the so-called friendships and hostilities that reproduce themselves under every heading within the imperialist system and feed each other. No justification can justify the expansionist attitude of the capitalist class of this or that country. Similarly, there is no excuse for open or covert cooperation with imperialist countries.
21. While the TKP says that the Kurdish issue is unsolvable in terms of the current order, it also claims that the current exploitation order is what turns the Kurdish phenomenon into a problem. For a party claiming a socialist revolution, the Kurdish issue is not a problem, but a reality, a dynamic. The struggle and contribution of Kurdish workers are indispensable for an independent and sovereign country where equality, brotherhood, justice, prosperity, abundance and enlightenment prevail. This approach naturally requires moving the issue to a class basis. TKP strives for the alignment and struggle to take place not on the basis of ethnic identities but on a class basis. In this sense, we cannot have the slightest sensitivity towards the Kurdish capitalists or rich, who win both in the conflict environment and in the “solution” processes, who have big investments all over Turkey and Iraq, who use tribal relations to use the Kurdish poor as cheap labor and deceive them, and we cannot adopt an opportunist attitude such as adjusting our ideological and political positions according to the ethnic structure of the region in which we are struggling.
22. The TKP focuses on Kurdish workers and acts on the fact that the source of the current order reproducing the Kurdish problem is exploitation relations. The village evacuations and migration to the west, which came to the agenda in certain periods of the history of the Republic, and most recently in the 1980s served a political purpose such as the elimination of many settlements, while on the other hand, it also served the function of meeting the increasing labor force need in the industrial and service sectors. Today, the majority of the Kurdish workers work or seek employment in large cities in the west, especially in Istanbul. Despite the passing of so many years, the unemployment rate in cities where Kurds live is higher than in other provinces. Kurdish workers are the ones who feel the consequences of Turkish capitalism’s perception of poor peasants as a cheap labor force and the imposition of insecure and flexible work most intensely. Kurdish workers constitute a significant portion of the labor force, especially in the construction sector. When we take into account that Kurdish workers continue to be the most prone segment of the Turkish proletariat to organized political struggle, the gravity of the consequences of the Kurdish movement’s strategy of oscillating between liberalism and nationalism and trying to keep Kurdish capital and the Kurdish poor together are better understood.
23. However, the Kurdish movement had formed an important branch in the Turkish labor movement thirty years ago. This branch had taken up space in the unionization of public workers and instilled radicalism in some sectors and unions. Later, this sensitivity of the movement faded and workers ceased to have any meaning beyond the mass base of any established party. Gradually, Kurdishness became an obstacle to the organization of the multicultural and multi-ethnic Turkish working class. One of the reasons why KESK could not hold its own against the right-wing civil servant unions led by the dominant powers is that the identity struggle took precedence over the class struggle and over time stifled it. Today, it is seen that the most important accumulation of Kurdish workers has been drawn to the municipalities governed by the HDP and now the DEM. However, as a result, there is a big gap. Kurdish workers who voted for their national identity in the elections are actually politically helpless. TKP should evaluate this contradictory situation not as a factor that blocks its way but as a mean to access the working masses.
24. The working class of Turkey is a whole with different languages and cultures, ethnic, national and cultural diversity. The Communist Party of Turkey is the leading party of the working class, regardless of the mother tongue of the workers and the identities they find appropriate to define themselves. TKP rejects the fact that the characteristics related to mother tongue and ethnic/national origin are considered as a reason for superiority or humiliation of one group over another.
25. The process that the communists envision, which will provide a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue, will begin with the first stage of the socialist revolution, the seizure of political power, and the prohibition of all ethnic discrimination; it will continue with the elimination of the material basis of ethnic discrimination and ideological prejudices from the past, in the process of social revolution, in which the class inequalities inherited from capitalism will be significantly eliminated, and will be completed with the elimination of all cultural elements related to people’s ethnic origins as a subject of politics on the path to a communist society. The socialist revolution is a prerequisite for the solution of the Kurdish issue. A planned economy based on public ownership will not only provide the basis for the elimination of the tribal structure that still exists, but will also provide the infrastructure for Kurds to achieve prosperity and equality like citizens of other origins. In this context, the resources mobilised by socialism will be used to eliminate regional inequalities, in contrast to the capitalist system that seeks opportunities to condemn a certain region of Turkey to backwardness and poverty through ‘regional minimum wage’ and similar policies.
26. In the solution our party envisions for the Kurdish issue, a separate Kurdish state, local autonomy or a federative structure is not on the agenda. There is no talk of a principle of the Right of Nations to Self-Determination that is independent of the theories of Imperialism and Revolution and today’s international realities. From our party’s perspective, the minimum geography of the socialist revolution is the political borders of the Republic of Turkey, and the state form it envisions is a centralized socialist republic that recognizes the ethnic rights of all its citizens and is the most revolutionary and advanced option in which the working people are in a common organisation and struggle.
27. In the Middle East, states have bargained with Kurdish rulers for hundreds of years, sometimes making concessions, and sometimes oppressing the Kurdish people. The Republic of Turkey’s record on this issue is no different. On the other hand, imperialism has always seen the Kurdish dynamic as a factor to be used; this usefulness has occasionally increased the bargaining power of some Kurdish subjects and made the poor Kurds, who are part of or sympathizers of these subjects, feel “empowered.” However, the Kurdish people and Kurdish workers have not been treated equally and respectfully by any of their interlocutors to date. In the crude pragmatism of the Kurdish political movement and its destructive rudeness towards the leftist subjects it has formed an alliance with, apart from being a bourgeois political movement, this historical experience has also played a role in its rote learning. Therefore, both on the path to revolution and after the revolution, equality and respect will be the ideological elements that the revolutionary subject should be most sensitive about in its policy towards the Kurdish issue. Because, throughout the process, sabotage and provocations coming from “inside” will probably take place under this heading.
28. One of the most important element of this equality and respect in the field of ideology is respect for the mother tongue, which is the means of expressing identity. In terms of socialism, it is a fundamental and indisputable principle that every worker should be able to receive education in their own mother tongue, as well as being able to engage in science, art and politics. There will be a very strong connection between the attention to be paid in this regard in the social stage of the socialist revolution and the gaining the Kurdish people to the revolution.
29. After oscillating between war with low intensity and solution processes, the current system has tried to stabilise the policies of repression and denial regarding the ‘Kurdish question’. The attempt to legitimise these policies on the grounds of ‘security’ has its limits. TKP acts by taking into account the fact that actions and positionings that are part of imperialist projects or in interaction with those projects are against the existence of Turkey, not against the present capitalist domination. However, in today’s Turkey, which is a part of the imperialist system, the attitude of the government towards the Kurdish people and politicians has nothing to do with this. On the contrary, the mentality that tries to take away the right of the Kurdish people to live their own language, traditions and culture, that interferes even in people’s halaying, on the one hand insists on a denialist attitude that tramples all kinds of sense of justice, on the other hand alienates the Kurdish poor from Turkey and makes them hope for help from imperialist powers. TKP has the experience to distinguish the difference between following nationalist or imperialist collaborator policies and taking a stand against injustice and tyranny. The ground on which this difference will emerge is not the distance towards this or that movement, but the struggle for justice and the search for rights, which will develop under the determination of class-based policies.
30. In light of all these assessments and principles, the party attaches special importance to the organization of Kurdish workers and allocates the necessary resources; increases the ideological and political struggle against Turkish and Kurdish nationalism, which provides the basis for the continuation of the exploitation system, the division of workers, and the increase in the ability of imperialist countries to intervene; stands against the regime politics’ reduction of the Kurdish issue to the heading of security and terror; underlines that the independence of the Turkish revolutionary movement from the Kurdish movement and the CHP is a class issue; creates the conditions for the training and prominence of more Kurdish cadres in the party, ensures that they master the Kurdish language and culture; strengthens the central contribution channels to the organizational practices in settlements where Kurds live densely, and to the experiences of neighborhood houses and village houses.
F. Facts about the immigrant issue and tasks of the party
Current status
1. The source of the migrant issue should not be permitted to be obscured. The responsibility for displacing millions of people lies with the capitalist class’s pursuit of cheap labor, imperialist wars, and the unprecedented poverty and inequalities created by capitalism. In the 21st century, the world once again presents an image of a mass migration of nations. Developed capitalist countries, while building walls at their borders and renting concentration camps in poorer countries, are also systematically opening channels to meet their labor needs with migrants. Xenophobia and racism, which seem contradictory but are actually complementary, are being fueled by capitalist governments to implement these policies together.
2. The policies of the AKP government have been decisive in the arrival of millions of people to our country. AKP is one of the main implementers of the global plot and jihadist attack against Syria. Government and capitalist spokespeople have repeatedly admitted openly that they exploit refugees as a factor that reduces costs. In addition to forcing the country’s people to work at the brink of hunger and poverty and leaving them unemployed, migrants are being ruthlessly exploited. On top of this, the government is using these people as a weapon to change Turkey’s demographic structure. The aim is to expand the base of Islamist policies on one hand and to increase the number of the desperate who feel compelled to the government on the other.
3. Money is being made off of migrants. Employers are working millions of migrants who have taken refuge in our country, which has already turned into a reservoir of cheap labor, under very harsh conditions. While the shame of selling citizenship for money has fallen upon the country, rents are being collected from Western countries to prevent migrants from leaving Turkey. With the agreement known as “readmission,” our country has been turned into a paid slave market where European monopolies can select and take whomever they want.
4. The benefits that Turkish capitalism gains from the exploitation of migrant labor should also include the transfer of value to international capital, particularly European capital. Since 2015, integration processes for migrant workers have been carried out through joint commissions involving both the EU Commission and international financial institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and others. Funds have been established in this regard.
5. The AKP government sees the migrant population as a tool for intervening in the internal affairs of the country they came from. The Neo-Ottoman policies of the government and the interests of monopolistic capital intersect in this context, with poor migrants being evaluated as potential legionnaires in foreign policy while students and the children of wealthy families are educated and turned into missionaries in line with the interests of Turkish capitalism.
6. In all societies where poverty and unemployment are rampant, capitalist governments blame foreigners for the problem. Everywhere that receives migrants, xenophobia is applied as state policy. These states are not incapable of controlling their borders, but it suits them to direct the workers’ anger towards foreigners instead of the system. In our country too, the racist opposition fueling xenophobia and the government leaving the borders unguarded represent two sides of the same medal.
7. In addition to all this, AKP’s migration policy has contributed to Turkey becoming one of the leading countries in the drug economy and consequently turning the country into a hunting ground for international criminal organizations.
8. The migrant issue is essentially a class issue. It is a political and moral obligation for communists to see migrant workers as part of their own working class. However, the migrant issue in Turkey cannot be reduced to the rights of migrant workers alone, as it is the product of very complex dynamics. Given factors such as the unionization rate of the Turkish working class and the prevalence of unregistered and precarious work, expecting a massive influx of migrants mixed with jihadists to carry further and energise the Turkish working-class movement would be unrealistic. Communists must approach the migrant issue in a multifaceted manner.
9. The radical decline in population renewal rates presents new data for the government’s migration policy in Turkey. The most significant tool at the government’s disposal to balance the decrease in birth rates, which is largely the result of economic hardships but explained by Erdoğan as an attack on the family institution, is refugees. The government, having to take seriously the reactions to migrants exploited by some racist parties and politicians in society, is expected to place more emphasis on the needs of the Turkish economy in the coming period.
Tasks of the party
10. The Communist Party of Turkey reiterates its demand for the immediate annulment of the Readmission Agreement signed with the European Union and rejects the transformation of our country into a concentration camp for migrants. It endeavours to expose and end the negotiations and bargains with the European Union, which have once again intensified in this context.
11. The party declares that the ambiguity of borders, which creates grounds for regional conflicts, facilitates interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and poses serious security issues for our people, must end. It emphasizes the need for border control and the prevention of human trafficking. The party also demands transparency regarding all information about migrants residing in our country and the opening of the AKP’s citizenship granting practices to public scrutiny. Those who have committed crimes against the people and humanity in their countries, including jihadists, should be prosecuted and extradited to the countries where they committed these crimes. Encouraging migrants to return to their home countries and engaging in dialogue with relevant states to resolve the issue rather than exploit it are also part of the TKP’s solution to the matter. In this context, the demand for co-operation with the Syrian government to ensure that Syrian migrants who have not committed crimes against humanity can return to their country voluntarily and in protection of their citizenship rights should be given special importance and kept on the agenda.
12. The most significant aspect of the ground that renders migrants desperate and allows for their exploitation by the powers of the system is the disorganization of our working people. Preventing precarious and unregistered work, ensuring that the poor who live by their labor can benefit from all kinds of human and labor rights, and raising the struggle of the Turkish working class together with migrant workers for basic rights and against exploitation is an unpostponable duty of the party.
13. The party adopts a rational and principled approach based on the historical interests of the Turkish working class in the fight against xenophobia and racism, which is attempted to be legitimized on the grounds of natural cultural differences or the presence of jihadists among migrants and those inclined to commit crimes against women and children. The party gives special attention to solidarity with migrant workers and their families who are victimized, threatened, and pushed into ghettos, in the activities of the District Houses.
14. The party opposes the sale of citizenship for money, the purchase of property by foreigners, and the making of this a criterion for acquiring citizenship.
G. The transformation in Turkish economy and the field of class struggle
Current status
1. The disorganization of the working class is the freedom of the capitalist class. During this period, where the retreat of the working-class movement continues, the imperialist-capitalist system not only burdened the structural difficulties, crisis dynamics, and shocking developments affecting the international arena entirely on the shoulders of the working masses but also created opportunities that went beyond short-term solutions in some instances. The pandemic has abundantly proven how great an opportunity the disorganization of the working class is for the capitalist class. Humanity, placed in a climate of great fear, had to silently watch the decline in real wages, the spread of precariousness, and the restriction of the right to organize and protest, while multinational monopolies skillfully used this free environment to open new avenues for investment and profit. Yet, the capitalist world dominated by these same monopolies proved to be devoid of even the simplest planning skills in the face of a pandemic.
2. After the fascist coup of September 12th, 1980, which was the most comprehensive intervention in the organized struggle of the working class in Turkey, the working class, despite making some significant advances, could not achieve the organization and influence it had in the 1970s. In this respect, the Turkish bourgeoisie is as free and spoiled as it can be, adept at loading the problems created by capitalism, which it can never solve, onto the backs of the working people and creating opportunities for its own coffers from these problems.
3. The claim that the dominance of capital relies primarily on repression mechanisms to push the Turkish working class into inertia should be approached with caution. Restrictive regulations and the criminalization of even the most ordinary examples of thought and action, especially during the AKP years, do not change the fact that a broad segment of the working class consented to the empowerment of the capitalist class. It is clear that AKP has immobilized the working class more through ideological instruments than through a carrot-and-stick approach. Those who today speak only of “Palace fascism” have played an auxiliary role in confusing the working people’s minds with Europeanism, civil societism, identity politics, and the nonsense of downsizing the state. Adding to this the religiosity, the submissive stance continuously proposed to secular segments by the CHP, the use of the Kurdish issue to leave the working class entangled in nationalisms, and the neutralization of DİSK (confederation of trade unions – private sector) and KESK (confederation of trade unions – public sector) by the CHP and HDP, it is clear that much more than gendarmerie-police repression lies behind the working class’s inertia.
4. The Turkish bourgeoisie skillfully employs tools that imprison the working class in many countries, such as indebting, using migrants as an element of intra-class competition, and forcing flexible and precarious work. In addition, it drives workers to obedience and contentment through fellow hometownship and sect connections. There is a parallel between this ability of the capitalist class and its success in navigating crises with minimal damage and maximum profit. The flexibility and mercantile creativity, which are among the greatest advantages of Turkish capitalism, can be said to alleviate and balance a number of structural problems. The capitalist class and the AKP government, which managed to navigate the 2018 crisis, which could have had very severe consequences, by implementing successive policies that sometimes contradicted each other, continued in a similar manner in the subsequent period. It is already debatable whether the conditions for the implementation of a coherent economic policy, agreed upon by the entire capitalist class, are present. Moreover, it is an illusion to think that a comprehensive program is a solution to the bottlenecks experienced by Turkish capitalism. Throughout the period, discussions on this axis were carried out under the assumption that there was a more balanced and proper set of policies within the system. However, exaggerated and dismissive adjectives such as incompetence, failure, and ineffectiveness in relation to the practices have made it difficult to diagnose that Turkish capitalism is undergoing a kind of “changing of the guard,” leading to superficial assessments of the situation of the working class. Ultimately, a “program” that also had the feature of suppressing a possible worker resistance was implemented and it was largely successful in terms of targets and interests of the capital.
5. The policies implemented by the AKP government, symbolized by “low interest rates,” should not be explained merely by Erdoğan’s obstinacy or the ignorance of Islamist cadres, despite objections from within the business world that are mostly for show. While there is a religious aspect (nas), the low interest rate policy had significant outcomes such as transferring the risks of foreign currency debts to the public by converting them into TL, supporting both temporary and structural investment initiatives by taking advantage of the pandemic, and increasing production capacity. In this context, it is incorrect to call the “low interest rate” period a failure or disaster, as it provided the AKP government with opportunities to continue some populist practices during a difficult time. Just as the current “orthodox” policies are in the interests of the capitalist class, the policies implemented under the responsibility of Albayrak and Nebati were also in the interests of Turkish bourgeoisie, at the expense of the broad working masses.
6. Today, the most crucial criterion for the “recovery” of the capitalist order or the “success” of a crisis program is undoubtedly the expansion of industrial production and the surplus value pool. “Recovery” does not necessarily imply permanent stability. Even for imperialist countries in today’s world, it is impossible to speak of complete stability, let alone for Turkish capitalism. For Turkish capitalism, “recovery” can be defined as the clarification of a medium-term strategic direction and an increase in assertiveness. Considering that there has been a kind of stalling since the early 2010s, there is potential for a partial leap forward in the near future, based on strengthening the industrial core. Indeed, the fact that major business groups such as Koç and Sabancı are developing medium-term strategies and setting targets support this assessment. Although these strategies do not mean a complete technological upheaval and a radical break from labor intensity, they contain elements that will provide new opportunities for Turkish capitalism. Undoubtedly, this orientation should be taken into consideration together with the serious problems embodied in the stagnation in industrial production and high unemployment rates. Nevertheless, claims and insinuations that Turkish capitalism has given up on industry do not hold any ground. It is true that the plundering of public assets, the liberalization of public services, and similar tools marked the previous period with significant value transfers. However, there is insufficient data at this stage to speak of a fundamental change in the structure where industrial production is strong, showing a certain level of development, and the balance between export and domestic market is established on the axis of integration into international markets. It is observed that sectors such as the arms industry, aerospace, machinery, electrical equipment, automotive, and energy equipment continue to grow, and the technology level of the manufacturing industry’s production composition is improving. However, it should not be assumed that an “internal market”-oriented “national production” drive will emerge from this. It should be remembered that both the leading sectors and the entirety of industrial production primarily target international markets, shaped by the opportunities opened within the international division of labor and value chains. For Turkey, a development pathway can be described that includes the potential outcomes of some new claims and the gains in the existing international division of labor with the advantages provided by these claims. In this context, it is necessary to be cautious in describing the orientation towards medium and high technology sectors, which is also essential for sustainability, as a leap forward for Turkish capitalism. The scale and diversity of the manufacturing industry infrastructure are elements that make Turkish capitalism ambitious and attractive on the international stage.
7. The recent increase in profit rates for capital is not solely due to the decline in real wages. The increase in the share of manufacturing industry production in the sectoral composition of the economy and growth targets based on relatively capital-intensive sectors have also been significant factors. Analyses that point only to insufficient wage increases in the face of astronomical price hikes as the main explanation for the largest wave of impoverishment in Turkey’s history make it difficult to fully grasp the consequences of a reconstruction attempt centered primarily on the expansion of industrial production. Parallel to the expansion in industrial production, significant employment growth has occurred; a significant shift in the composition of the working class in favor of industry began to be observed. The transition from lower-wage and insecure jobs to higher-wage and relatively secure jobs, although real wages have fallen, has meant wage increases for some segments of the working class and, along with new hires, an increase in total household income. The careful and cautious monitoring of these developments and their formation of a decisive picture will have significant consequences for class struggles in Turkey.
8. It is necessary to stop immediately to evaluate Turkish capitalism based on clichés (some of which are kept alive by opposition efforts). These clichés ultimately converge on the goal of a “properly functioning, rule-based capitalism.” In this sense, the image of the “Gang of Five,” which has been continuously kept on the agenda in recent times, has played a significant role in exonerating big capital. While questioning the super-profits obtained by some capital groups through political connections and public resources, we cannot ignore the fact that the massive leap in surplus value extraction is a product of the expansion in capital accumulation. In this context, rather than focusing on the irregularities in the division of a fixed market share by capital, it is necessary to focus on the constant growth of the market share seized by the capitalist class through the intense exploitation of workers. Proposals such as “wealth tax” and “taxation of super-profits” obscure the main source of profits, create confusion with differences between sectors and capitals, and serve to keep the working class away from a holistic struggle. Similarly, the unfounded propositions put forward regarding the economic consequences of lawlessness in Turkey should be set aside. Capital does not seek a strong, well-functioning, and just legal system; rather, monopolies in the world and in Turkey are the driving force behind lawlessness.
9. It is not possible to ignore the differences, conflicts, and competition within capital, whether on Turkish or global scale. However, it would not be realistic to speak of a conflict that marks the current period, directs economic policies, and leads to major disruptions. On the contrary, compared to normal periods, conflicts have been suppressed to a certain extent, the hierarchy of capital has been maintained, and destructive results that could arise from chain reactions have been prevented. In this regard, it is evident that significant adjustments have been made for industrial capital, financial capital, commercial capital, and certain groups such as construction and energy. These observations do not contradict the fact that, by the nature of the period, tensions between the capitalist class and political power have increased and political alternative searches have intensified, both overt and covert. Different segments of capital have also been directed towards different searches. However, as mentioned above, a program directed by a common capital intellect has been implemented, and no significant deviations have emerged concerning the main direction.
10. The level of international integration of Turkish capitalism and the multifaceted relationships established within the imperialist system continue to be a strong anchor from an economic perspective. The collaboration with international financial institutions, primarily the World Bank, and the close tracking of recent European Union economic policies, such as the effort to align with the European Green Deal, indicate a strategic direction beyond mere pragmatism for securing resources and protecting markets. In addition to securing the presence of multi national monopoiles in Turkey, the opportunities provided for the internationalization of Turkish capital should also be evaluated in the context of international integration. Turkish capitalism is asserting its ambition to offer more as a production base and market to international capital, especially in the medium term. The investments of major capital groups in various parts of the world, particularly in Europe, also promise a more advanced contribution to the value transfer mechanism through the “global value chain” structure. In summary, Turkey is not only an attractive country for international capital, especially European/German capital, with the exploitation of cheap labor in labor-intensive sectors but also as a country with skilled labor and a developed infrastructure in capital-intensive sectors.
11. The claim of the capitalist class to raise the bar in the medium term is closely related to the evaluation of some opportunities arising from international developments. The strengthening tendency for close supply during the pandemic, the multi-dimensional opportunities arising from the war in Ukraine, and the expansion of market opportunities in North America, especially in the US, can be mentioned in this context. However, beyond the space opened for Turkish capitalism in this way, the fact that it has shown ability to manage the economic and political effects of major financial constraints, pandemics, wars, earthquakes, and especially the ability to control the labor class dynamic despite, or with the help of, a very large wave of poverty has increased the credibility of this claim in the eyes of international capital. It is not possible to say that the structural problems and vulnerabilities of Turkish capitalism have been eliminated. There are a number of uncertainties and risks. However, the possibility of continuing both quantitative and qualitative expansion for another period is within the realm of possibility. Considering the adjustments for the balance between export and domestic market, it is likely that the capitalist order may make some corrections in the distribution within capital and limited corrections towards the working class as we head towards 2028. At least, there is an expanding reserve that can be used to make such a correction when needed.
12. Another success of Turkish capital is integrating the working class into its order. Today, workers aspire to escape from being a worker. The desire to earn money easily has become widespread through platforms such as the stock market, cryptocurrencies and online betting platforms. This effect is observed not only among all strata of workers but also among high school and university students.
Tasks of the party
13. The prolonged inactivity of the Turkish working class due to complex political, ideological, and cultural reasons cannot be overcome solely by the shock effect of vanguard actions or through protracted organizational efforts. Vanguard actions and resistances, along with meticulous and patient organizational efforts aimed at gaining positions, are indispensable elements of revolutionary struggle. However, for the working class to weigh in on national politics today, a comprehensive effort must be made to re-establish class identity and culture. Rightly recognizing that the fragmentation of the class weakens the working class, the Party has taken steps to establish the Unity Union (Birlik Sendikası) to create a higher worker identity. Despite gaining meaningful positions in some sectors, the form of the Unity Union has not achieved the desired impact. Nevertheless, the continuous deterioration of working and living conditions today creates a very conducive environment for workers to become aware of class contradictions. In this context, what is lacking is an enlightenment campaign directed at the working class. Therefore, the Party defines its primary task as abandoning the wage-centric perspective imposed on the working masses by reformism and union structures and undertaking a comprehensive effort to re-establish the exploitation mechanisms and the labor-capital contradiction in social perception. The number of worker houses will be increased, and widespread propaganda and educational material will be produced for the entire working class on all platforms. Our cultural and artistic activities will be structured with this priority in mind. It is acknowledged that the “consciousness” gap within the working class regarding understanding class contradictions and exploitation mechanisms has narrowed, and there is no significant difference in class consciousness between educated labor and manual labor. The ideological struggle of the Party prioritizes ensuring the psychological superiority of the working class over the bourgeoisie and the middle classes.
14. The Party proceeds from the fact that the idea that the Turkish working class can possess a “developed” morality and class culture outside of organized struggle will lead to complacency and submission. Today, many resistance and rights-seeking struggles are being interrupted due to the erosion of the sense of solidarity and justice within the class. Moreover, the capital attacks have taken the alienation of the working class from the practice of working to a new phase, causing a significant portion of workers to lose their desire to work. In conditions where a minimum level of consciousness regarding exploitation mechanisms cannot be achieved, this lack of desire becomes a new obstacle to the working class forming a social identity. Furthermore, the capital class is quite content with this state of alienation, which partly causes inefficiency, as it diminishes the working class’s power to struggle and negotiate. While the Party rejects the thesis suggesting the revolutionary mission of the working class has disappeared and reaffirms the fact that the Turkish working class is the unique social force that will lead revolutionary transformations, it also opposes the illusion that workers will spontaneously and naturally reach class consciousness or always possess that consciousness. The Party makes necessary arrangements in internal education for Party workers to become exemplary worker leaders.
15. The Communist Party of Turkey places the task of achieving a leap in the social and political identity of the working class and forming advanced organizational positions at its center. In this context, instead of aiming for union management positions, party-affiliated workers strive for the working class to form a historical opposition to the capital class and to embrace the claim of establishing a new country. The tasks of workplace representation and branch management are tied to this priority, and every step that would mean becoming a part of the union bureaucracy is avoided.
16. “Patronların Ensesindeyiz” (PE – “We Breathe Down the Bosses’ Neck”), as a unique, flexible, and effective tool in the struggle for workers’ rights, is strengthened considering the above mentioned tasks. A developmental structure is established to make the success and accumulation of PE in individual struggle topics permanent and widespread. Efforts are organized to increase PE’s recognition among workers. PE communication-solidarity-struggle networks are set with certain standards while preserving the specificities of each sector or work area, and actions and activities are organized that consider the unity of the working class.
17. The Party maps out the detailed structure of the capital class to clearly reveal the place of large capital groups in the Turkish economy, to eliminate the misinformation created by those who classify the bourgeoisie as “good boss-bad boss” with labels such as “Gang of Five”, “Islamist Capital”, and “Partisan Capital”. This map also includes up-to-date data on the foreign investments of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Organizational efforts within the working class are planned in light of these concrete data, and the party’s strategic priorities are determined accordingly.
18. A study is initiated to examine the reasons that make the economic program implemented under the responsibility of Mehmet Şimşek inevitable from the capital’s perspective and the consequences of this program for the working class. Within this scope, a commission consisting of economists and worker leaders is established, closed and open evaluation meetings are organized, and a struggle program is drawn up.
19. An effective ideological counter-offensive that emphasizes the demand for nationalization will be carried out against privatization policies, which will expand in scope with new examples in the coming period. Practical actions will be taken to increase the awareness and resistance of the working masses, particularly in workplaces affected by these policies. It will be communicated to broad segments of society that steps aimed at reducing public employment and trimming workers’ acquired rights under the guise of cutting public expenditures are not for savings purposes but signify a new stage in the destruction of the public sector. Channels will be opened to support the struggle of public employees against this assault.
20. The decision made in previous conferences, “each organization must carry out a well-planned and systematic organizational work at least in one workplace and establish at least one workplace unit,” is followed, and central guidance and support channels are opened in this regard. The closure of organizations that do not progress towards this goal will be considered. The party focuses on workplaces that use high technology. An interim evaluation on this topic will be conducted at the beginning of 2025, and the results of this evaluation will be discussed within the party.
21. Steps are taken for the institutionalization of the Workers’ Academy, which started its activities in the previous period, in terms of curriculum, educational materials, and trainers. The aim is for the Academy to become one of the main tools for training the party’s cadres and leaders.
H. Internal class struggles, revolutionary tasks and the intervention of the TKP
Current status
1. The most important outcome of the March 31st local elections is the significant decrease in the AKP’s ability to limit the public’s reaction from turning into support for the opposition despite all kinds of discontent in society. There is no reason to see this development as a success of the opposition operating within the boundaries of the system, especially the CHP. Unlike the general elections held a year earlier, the local elections took place in a very low-key, tension-free atmosphere. The disorganization of the opposition and the events that occurred during the candidate selection process in the CHP, in particular, created deep disappointment not only in society but also within the CHP organization. In this context, the comments that Özgür Özel’s leadership has brought great dynamism to the CHP after the election are exaggerated and largely unfounded. The only element of “change” within the CHP that may reflect on voter behavior is the increased influence of Ekrem İmamoğlu in the party. However, this does not explain the extent of the decline in the AKP.
2. What has caused the unexpected retreat of the AKP is the new phase in the disintegration observed within the ruling bloc since 2013, which has sometimes led to great tensions. The most important characteristic of the recent period was the strategy that focused on the cracks within the ruling bloc rather than the societal reactions against the AKP. The Gülenists, who carried the struggle for power within the state bureaucracy to the point of a coup attempt, began to shape the opposition’s direction, and figures like Davutoğlu and Babacan being held in high regard by the CHP are in line with this strategy. Subsequently, the agenda of the six-party alliance (the “Table of Six”) always included a potential breakdown within the AKP. One can recall the months-long expectation that many MPs would break away from the AKP during the founding processes of the DEVA and Gelecek parties. However, what was observed before the March 31st elections was that the crack in the AKP was multi-dimensional, encompassing the entire institutional structure of power from the party organization to the state bureaucracy, from the Palace to the religious orders. Erdoğan, who has been very successful in managing such issues so far, this time could not suppress the tension except by making the parties dependent on him and preventing the questioning of his leadership. The main result of this tension, which significantly reduced the AKP’s energy during the election period, is that one of the parties has shown a defiant attitude that verges on sabotage within the entire institutional fabric of the government.
3. This assessment does not mean that the internal problems of the AKP have had a significant impact on voter preferences. Discontent towards the AKP had been spreading beyond the sections of society with secular-republican sensitivities for some time. The concerns created by the economic and social difficulties deepened during the pandemic turned into open dissatisfaction after the February 6th earthquake. The dissatisfaction deepened by high impoverishment rates did not reflect in the 2023 Presidential and parliamentary elections due to the opposition’s lack of credibility and the poor voters’ search for stability. The shift away from the ruling party observed in the local elections, but not in the general elections, can be explained by the fact that some segments of society, which do not give up on political stability, reflected their disappointments at the ballot box. The AKP’s inability to use instruments to prevent this shift is directly the result of internal tensions within the government.
4. The claim that the CHP’s success in the local elections was related to the candidates does not warrant a detailed assessment. This claim, also voiced by some AKP officials to deflect responsibility for the election failure, is refuted by the fact that many candidates who were generally considered weak received above-average votes. It is clear that the CHP won in some areas known as strongholds of the right with candidates of AKP or MHP origin or inclination. However, the CHP has been entering elections with right-wing candidates for a long time, and in this respect, there was no particular innovation in the March 31st elections. Moreover, these elections showed that some well-known CHP members do not have a loyal voter base. The almost open campaigns run by disgruntled politicians who were not nominated, especially in large settlements, yielded no results.
5. In contrast, the March 31st elections marked a new phase in Turkish politics being conducted through individuals rather than parties. The issue reached proportions that cannot be dismissed by saying, “Candidates are always more important in local elections.” We see that political party leaders, MPs, and mayors overshadow the parties, principles, ideologies, and programs entirely, and a similar trend is spreading downwards, even to the grassroots. The impact of the complete takeover of politics by this contextlessness, which we have witnessed for decades worldwide, on revolutionary struggle deserves detailed examination.
6. Our prediction that the axis of politics after the March 31st elections would be shaped not by the struggle between the AKP and CHP but by a tension reflecting all institutions and parties and having an international dimension was confirmed in a short time. Despite the complex picture created by the extensions of different capital groups and different religious orders fighting for their interests in different parties in Turkey, the political arena is increasingly defined by the struggle between two different tendencies. In this sense, it can be said that the emphasis on the different phases of AKP rule, which actually complement each other and thus do not form a significant opposition, has begun to gain some reality under today’s conditions. The fanatic pro-Americanism, excitement for the EU, liberal emphasis, initiative & resolution processes of the early period, which some coded as the AKP’s “factory default settings,” and the security-oriented discourse, claim of being national and local, and more balanced foreign policy between the US and Russia felt after 2013 form a continuity and integrity. This does not make the struggle between two different understandings in today’s political order completely “fake.” This struggle shapes all establishment parties and the “left” is seeking to integrate into the establishment politics as the only confrontation that can be deemed authentic in Turkey’s bourgeois politics.
7. The traces of the struggle between these two sides, which we mentioned, can be seen in all areas, from Özgür Özel starting to create a balance against İmamoğlu’s influence in the CHP to the scandals and fights in football, one of the most important elements of popular culture, to the movements within religious orders and the endless reckonings in the Ministry of Interior. However, the outcome of this struggle for the future of Turkish capitalism is limited. Turkey cannot fully enter the US orbit nor rely on the EU anchor once again. There is neither such an orbit nor such an anchor left anyway. There are also limits to Turkish capitalism moving away from the NATO alliance. It is impossible for the security-oriented paradigm to convince Turkish society and for the bourgeoisie to maintain a management approach based solely on coercion. As we previously emphasized, the space opened for the CHP is due not to its own program but to the limits reached by the AKP’s repeated sterile discourse. Considering the economic needs of Turkish capitalism, it is more likely that a median will gain importance rather than the extremes of either side. If the tension between the two sides leads to a break and evolves into a serious purge for various reasons, it is expected that the victorious wing will express itself not in extremes but in a more synthesized line. Of course, factors such as a comprehensive war or a sudden rise in the workers’ movement in Turkey can always lead to completely different outcomes.
8. It is foolish to think that the struggle between the submissive and negotiating wings encompassing all levels of establishment politics will not affect the political-ideological balances in Turkish society. The results and limits of the shock created by the high cost of living and the earthquake among conservative segments of society have not yet fully emerged. To the extent that this shock signifies a new source for the independent, statist, Republican, and even secular accumulation in Turkey, it is expected to lead to a structural change in this accumulation. The emergence of the poor and conservative segments from their shells imposes new and very serious responsibilities on the communist movement in terms of ideological struggle. Avoiding this responsibility will significantly devalue the independent, statist, Republican, and secular accumulation, which is of vital importance for the struggle for socialism. An effective intervention in this area is likely to create a tremendous energy source for the communist movement.
9. One of the main reasons why, in the struggle that has been going on within the politics and institutions of the system in recent months, the section that advocates closer co-operation with the USA and NATO has started to make its weight felt is the needs of the economic policies restructured in line with the requirements of Turkish capitalism. The resources required for these policies to yield the desired results for capital require co-operation with the powerful imperialist centres in North America and Europe. The bargaining elements, including the bureaucrats among them, who hide behind the ‘domestic and national’ discourse, are to a large extent either part of the capitalist class or an extension of it. As it has been proved time and again, it is impossible for the capitalist class to take a ‘principled’ position in terms of its own values against this or that imperialist power, let alone anti-imperialism.
10. It is not surprising that the polarization within the capitalistic social politics in Turkey completely shapes the so-called “left,” which operates within a libertarian paradigm. The fact that one of the sides includes fascists has resulted in the positioning on the other side being unquestioned. There is already a doubt as to whether the Turkish “left” has the intent and energy to question anything. The Turkish left has not only lined up behind the political and material opportunities presented by Ekrem İmamoğlu but has also become an adjunct to TÜSİAD’s projection for Turkey, hoping for a return to “factory settings” within the AKP and the state. Here, the influence of Kurdish politics, which acts according to its own agenda, and the comfort zone created by the “rise” of the CHP should also be taken into account.
11. As in the rest of the world, in Turkey, the dominance of capital is not represented solely by the party in government in the political arena. The condition for the sustainability of bourgeois dictatorship is that parties or individuals with different discourses can keep society within the boundaries of the system. Capital can abandon this nominal diversity and move towards a monolithic political structure only under very special conditions. However, more common and essential is the complementarity of bourgeois parties. In this sense, the normalization process between the CHP and the AKP after the 2024 local elections occurred through the direct intervention of the capital class, which does not want a political tension or crisis while an economic program with severe consequences for the working masses is being implemented. The CHP’s taking more initiative is the result of a division of labor shaped at the table. The Özgür Özel administration is quickly learning the boundaries and where it should stand in this division of labor.
12. The area that the optimism created around the claim of normalization does not affect at all is the AKP’s uninterrupted steps towards religionization. The most important reason for this insistence is that confronting secularism is an uninterrupted and never-ending agenda for the AKP. In an environment where there is no resistance to these interventions within capitalistic order politics, it cannot be expected for the government to abandon the most prominent ideological pathway on which it has established itself. One of the natural results of the weight of religious orders in the political arena and their competition with each other is reactionism. The hegemony struggle within the religious front in Turkey pushes all actors in this field towards radicalization, and the AKP, as a coalition, adapts to this tendency. Finally, it should be noted that the “sacred” is increasingly being resorted to control a large social segment left helpless by the high cost of living.
Tasks of the party
13. The Communist Party of Turkey completely rejects the simplistic approach of “fighting the Palace regime” observed in the polarization within establishment politics. It distances itself from a “left” that opens a covert or overt credit to European imperialists in terms of democracy and freedoms, a “left” that believes in the nonsense of good sect-bad sect, sees TÜSİAD as a modern and progressive element within capital, and adopts a growth strategy under the wings of the CHP or Kurdish political movement. The party operates on the truth that the greatest favor to the vibrant, revolutionary elements within the “left” is to strengthen an independent line, encouraging them to break away. In this context, the party prominently highlights its communist character and put aside the hollow “left” concept.
14. The party allocates more resources to the ideological struggle against “Marxist” currents that blend petty-bourgeois radicalism with social democracy to create theoretical justifications for settling into the system and class reconciliation. It prevents the intellectual representation of the revolutionary accumulation in Turkey by this “new social democratic” line, which is overly eclectic and shallow despite all efforts.
15. A multifaceted struggle is conducted to break the influence of those trying to convince sections with Republican, independent sensitivities to a neo-Ottoman strategy with the rhetoric of native and national, while legitimizing all forms of oppression, attacks on the working classes, corruption, narrowing of the political field, and generally fascist practices. Tools are developed to prevent Republican intellectuals, artists, journalists, and scientists, who are tired of the liberal “left’s” cosmopolitanism and identity politics culture, from being lost in this rhetoric. While exposing the class character of the “bargaining” wing that covers anti-people policies with the promise of a “strong Turkey” by exploiting the working people’s search for stability and security, it is concretely explained that socialism is the path to a “strong Turkey.” The “weak Turkey” strategy emerging in the “left” is condemned, and the fact that the dictatorship of capital is what makes the country fragile is more effectively and widely communicated.
16. The party develops an approach that avoids simplistic tactics towards working and poor segments who are under the influence of conservative ideologies but are not hesitant to communicate with communists, listen to them, and are open to persuasion. Detailed and accurate data are collected and analyzed for localities where even small successes have been achieved in this regard. District Houses are planned to be restructured in a way that facilitates communication with these segments. While making the most of the opportunities provided by fragmented and local resistances and union practices in workplace organization to contact conservative workers, the content and form of the tools the party has developed for the organization of the class are radically reviewed. Women’s Solidarity Committees develop content to counteract the pollution created by the liberal women’s movement in communication with women in conservative neighborhoods.
17. To prevent the society from being captivated by the two capital lines that lock the political field in Turkey and actually complement each other — the “modern, Western, democratic, European” or the “authoritarian, native, national, strong, imperial” options — comprehensive, modern, and revolutionary tools are developed to introduce socialism as a current social project into the agenda of the working people. In this direction, preparations begin at the beginning of 2025 for a wide-ranging ideological offensive to widely bring the socialist option against the dictatorship of capital onto the agenda of the working people.
18. The party structures its communication channels to overcome this challenging ideological and political task. Without waiting for the various factions of the CHP to open up space for TKP by utilizing the opportunities provided by local administrations, and without solely relying on the extremely valuable efforts of our friends scattered across many platforms, the party’s voice is delivered to the broadest possible social segments.
19. The party takes the initiative to transform the People’s Representatives Assembly of Turkey, which we have brought to the agenda to cleanse the republican accumulation from liberal or nationalist influences and ensure healthy communication and interaction with the goal of socialism, into a network of struggle, organization, and discussion step by step.
20. A widespread and effective struggle is organized against the destruction caused by the private sector in fundamental social services such as education and healthcare. A strong ideological and political opposition is developed against the illusion that scientific and secular education and quality healthcare can only be accessed with money.
21. The party intensifies the struggle for secularism and enlightenment. All resources are mobilized to roll back the place of religious sects in public and social life, organize effective resistance against ongoing reactionary interventions in many areas, especially education, and support the efforts of the THTM in this direction. One of the most critical aspects of this struggle is to eliminate any confusion about secularism observed among devout segments.
22. The new Constitution preparations initiated by the AKP have no legitimacy. An effective opposition is organized against the efforts to crown the counter-revolutionary steps taken since 2002 with a fundamental document. It persistently emphasizes and warns that participating in the new Constitution preparations with ‘suggestions’ would mean supporting this counter-revolutionary process. The party intervenes in this agenda by clearly outlining what socialism would mean in political, economic, social, and cultural fields in Turkey, as stated in one of its most fundamental documents, the Social Constitution. Coordination is ensured with the activities to be carried out by THTM in this direction.
23. Tools are developed to win over engineers, technical personnel, and scientists, influenced by Turkey’s increasing regional influence and the changes in Turkish capitalism that open up more space for high technology, who oscillate between patriotism and nationalism, and an imperial vision. Efforts are made for the THTM to play a role in this context as well.
24. The party acts with speed and impact to invalidate the “current” references that allow the liberal-nationalist, pro-caliphate-Turkist, Kurdish-Turkist tensions to paralyze the working masses. Being aware of the legitimacy these ideologies provide to each other, methods are developed to condemn the polarization itself rather than the poles.
25. A multi-faceted intervention is implemented to detach the few revolutionary elements left from social democracy, who have completely given up on questioning and debating the CHP, making their positioning within the system permanent, attracted by the opportunities created by local administrations.
26. The party monitors local administrations in every district and neighborhood where it conducts organized work, attends council meetings, informs the public, and takes action on issues of struggle. Party experts are activated, and party friends are called to duty. Honest and patriotic council members and headmen are cooperated with, and “local administration” agendas are particularly highlighted in the establishment of local People’s Representatives Assemblies.
27. For years, the May Day celebrations have been rendered meaningless, the Taksim ban turned into an excuse to pass over the day, and mass actions replaced by events narrowed down to union administrations. Due to their competition with each other, they couldn’t solve even the simplest organizational problems, and opened the rally platforms to parties of the capitalistic order. With the great irresponsibility displayed in Saraçhane this year, union administrations have shown that they have entirely lost their competence to organize May Day celebrations. The Communist Party of Turkey does not participate in May Day celebrations organized by the current union understanding and takes the initiative to ensure that the struggle day of the working class takes place with content that will increase the energy of the working masses.
28. The Congress sets the party’s taking root & strengthening in organizational and political terms as its primary goal. Taking root & strengthening comes into focus concerning solving problems such as the inability to take root, discontinuity, and lack of energy observed from time to time in party work. The decisions taken in the Congresses and Conferences after 2017 determine the direction of this goal. With the awareness of having ample resources, motivation, and determination to fulfill this responsibility, the Party addresses the organizational details of the Congress decisions in the final session of the Congress process.
29. The party completes the organizational steps taken to ensure the permanence of members and volunteers in the struggle for socialism during the 14th Congress process. All deficiencies in the party’s reporting, recording, and member tracking systems are rectified. Measures are taken to ensure that all levels of the party act with advanced responsibility regarding this issue. As a revolutionary party, the TKP establishes an advanced operation that minimizes energy and time loss, ensures the participation of all resources of the party, and facilitates the participation of workers in party life, whose living and working conditions are becoming increasingly difficult. The party sheds some habits and stereotypes from the past; it acts on the fact that the organizational culture of the communist movement is determined by the Leninist understanding of leadership and the immediacy of the socialist revolution. The party adds new elements to party life to transform into a revolutionary tool that manages not itself but the struggle and social dynamics.
30. Additional measures are taken to strengthen collectivism in party life. Internal communication and solidarity are reinforced to prevent party militants and friends from being condemned to individual and futile solutions against the encirclement of the capitalist order. The damage social media inflicts on party order and collective culture is minimized. Measures are taken to ensure that party education is not interrupted under any circumstances; educational mechanisms are standardized for all levels and needs. All resources are mobilized to use the party’s existing accumulation effectively in theoretical production and ideological struggle; channels are opened for the development of members inclined towards theoretical production and creativity.
31. The party makes special assignments to benefit from the opportunities brought by digitalization and takes steps to use artificial intelligence effectively. Measures are taken to protect the party’s political and organizational existence against cyber attacks. Conditions are created for our members to use new technologies effectively for the interests of the struggle for socialism.
32. All organizations of the Communist Party of Turkey act with the awareness that the goal of “strengthening” is possible by taking root in their areas of activity and engaging in a hegemony struggle. In the weeks following the Congress, all organizations set their period goals in this direction and submit them for Central Committee approval. The Turkey Communist Youth and Women’s Solidarity Committees also hold their conferences immediately after the Congress and set their period goals in line with the congress decisions. The party’s production and struggle in the field of culture and arts will be examined through a conference that will gather party members working in this field, in light of the political and organizational tasks determined by the Congress.
33. 33. The intervention in 2014 to force the Communist Party of Turkey to abandon its principles, values and goals was an absolute failure. This failure is the result not only of the determination to preserve and strengthen the principles, values and goals of the Communist Party of Turkey, but also of the rapid exposure of the hollowness behind a new liberal operation’s claim to represent ‘socialism’ in Turkey. The numerous divisions among those who broke away from the Communist Party of Turkey during the split in 2014 are more than just evidence of the ‘unprincipled unity’ that we insistently emphasised at the time. If a liberal-oriented intervention could not consolidate those who were knowingly or unknowingly part of that intervention, the political and organisational direction that the TKP has carried from yesterday to today has a weight in this. In this context, the Communist Party of Turkey invites all communists who comprehend the reasons for what happened ten years ago and identify themselves with the historical mission and programme of the TKP to its ranks.
34. The Congress, with unwavering faith in the bright future of Turkey and the world, greets all party members and friends of the party and invites all communists in Turkey to join the TKP ranks.
